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 1 Motivation 
 
Norway is the third largest gas exporter in the world. In 2015, exports of natural gas reached 
NOK 220 676 million, which is 26.4% of Norway’s total exports (Statistics Norway, 2016). A 
necessary condition for a well-functioning gas market is an available and efficient transport 
infrastructure. The gas transport infrastructure on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) is 
represented by a network of pipelines with a total length of 8,300 km, which links gas fields 
offshore with processing plants on the mainland and with receiving terminals in France, 
Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). About 5% of Norwegian gas is exported in 
liquid form by sea-going liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers to Europe, Asia, and North and 
South America (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2016). 
Development of the existing pipeline network started in the 1970s, when a gas transportation 
solution was required for the giant Ekofisk discovery. The result was the 443 km-long Norpipe, 
which connects the field with the Norsea Gas Terminal at Emden in Germany. This was the 
first pipeline to deliver Norwegian dry gas to European consumers in 1977. Since then, the 
transport system has been in constant development. From separate field-dedicated solutions, 
it emerged into an integrated network that serves most of the fields on the NCS and ensures 
reliable and cost-efficient delivery of gas to Europe.  
The use and development of the gas transport infrastructure on the NCS is organised around 
three cornerstones: ownership, operatorship and regulation. The framework for all Norwegian 
petroleum activities is determined by the Storting (the Norwegian parliament). Based on the 
petroleum activities act (Petroleum Act1), and the associated regulations (Petroleum 
Regulations2), the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy executes all regulations. After a major 
reorganisation of the petroleum sector in Norway in 2001, most of the gas transport systems 
were merged into a joint venture called Gassled, which became the formal owner of the 
transport system. In order to ensure non-discriminatory third-party access to the Gassled 
transport system, an independent system operator was appointed, the state-owned company 
Gassco AS. 
Gassco plays several roles that are divided into two groups: normal and special operatorship. 
The tasks that are carried out on behalf of the system owners, in accordance with the operator 
agreement, are usually referred to as normal operatorship. These include operating the 
infrastructure in accordance with the Petroleum Act, as well as health, safety and 
environmental legislation. Special operatorship responsibilities include transport capacity 
allocation, system operation and the development of the gas transport system. These 
responsibilities are directly assigned to Gassco by the Petroleum Act (Section 4-9) and the 
Petroleum Regulations (Chapter 9), and are carried out on behalf of all system users. 
According to the capacity allocation task, Gassco collects data on the spare capacity available 
in the system and holds booking rounds twice a year, where eligible shippers can request 
spare capacity for medium and long terms. On a daily basis, Gassco handles requests for 
additional capacity for short terms. The allocated capacity can be transferred between the 
shippers bilaterally in the secondary capacity market, which is also administered by Gassco.  
                                               
1 Act relating to petroleum activities (the Petroleum Act), 29 November 1996, No. 72 
2 Regulations to the Act relating to petroleum activities, 27 June 1997, No. 65. 
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System operatorship represents Gassco’s main daily activities: dispatching of the gas fields, 
coordination of gas flows in the network, and balancing the volumes fed into the system and 
taken out of the system. Gassco charges tariffs for access to the Gassled transport system. 
The tariffs are stipulated by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, based on a formula provided 
in the tariff regulations.3 The tariff consists of two parts: an operating element and a capital 
element. The operating element covers the costs of operating the transport system, while the 
capital element covers the investment costs made by the owners. The existing tariff system 
ensures that the returns in the gas sector are derived from gas extraction and production, and 
not from transportation. At the same time, the tariffs should provide a reasonable return on 
investments to the infrastructure owners (Petroleum Regulation, Section 63).   
Regarding the development of the transport system, Gassco assumes the role of coordinator, 
or ‘architect’, of the network’s expansion. Gassco operates on a ‘no profit no loss’ basis and 
does not invest in infrastructure projects; however, the company plays an active role in 
investment planning. Thus, Gassco contributes to the comprehensive development of the 
transport system by considering new infrastructure projects from the perspective of long-term 
value creation in the gas sector. In this context, both the gas from the fields that triggered the 
development and the potential volumes that may come on stream later are taken into 
consideration.  
The relationships between regulation, ownership and operatorship of the Norwegian gas 
transport system are schematically represented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 Main parties involved in gas transport infrastructure development 
Development of the transport system is a particular aspect of this structure, because 
development of a new infrastructure is financed by commercial companies, but regulated by 
the government through a license system and regulated tariffs. Consequently, the interests of 
the commercial companies undertaking the investments and the objectives of the government 
may not always coincide. The particular role of the system operator is to balance these 
                                               
3 Regulations relating to stipulation of tariffs, etc. for specific facilities, 20 December 2002, No. 1724. 
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interests and suggest solutions that correspond to the needs of shippers, provide a reasonable 
expected return to the investors, and contribute to the long-term welfare, thereby maximising 
the goals of the state. The conflicting interests of the parties involved and the resulting 
challenges of infrastructure planning and appraisal are the focus of this research project. 
Figure 1.2 depicts an understanding of the decision-making process used throughout this 
thesis regarding new infrastructure development in the Norwegian gas transport sector. In the 
annual plans, the system operator assesses the need for additional capacity with respect to 
exploration results and demand forecasts, and may initiate work on a new major infrastructure 
plan. In many cases, the planning for a particular transport facility is initiated by a company or 
a group of companies holding licences for petroleum production in the relevant area. The 
system operator is involved in the early stage of infrastructure planning. The operator performs 
its own assessments and makes recommendations regarding the technical aspects of the 
infrastructure facility, such as routing, landing points and capacity, but does not participate in 
investments and, therefore, cannot influence the final investment decision. When the concept 
is selected, one of the involved companies is appointed as the project’s operator during the 
construction period. This company conducts the pre-engineering phase of the project and 
prepares the Plan for installation and operation of facilities for transport and utilisation of 
petroleum (PIO), which represents the application for a pipeline licence. It includes an 
installation section and an impact assessment section. The installation section is devoted to 
the technical and financial aspects of a project, while the impact assessment focuses on the 
consequences of the project implementation (installation and operation) on the environment, 
natural resources and society as a whole.4 The basis for the impact assessment is an 
established study programme. Both the proposed study programme and the impact 
assessment are subjected to a public consultation. Based on the installation section and the 
impact assessment, as well as the consultation statements, the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy draws up a draft proposition for the Parliament or a Royal Decree, which is submitted 
to the relevant authorities, i.e. the Ministry of Labour, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
and Gassco, for consultation. The government then submits the case either to the Parliament 
or to the King in Council, depending on the size of the investment.  
A particular aspect of the planning process is concept selection. The circular arrows in Figure 
1.2 depict the tight collaboration and negotiations between the involved petroleum companies 
and the system operator at the stages of feasibility and conceptual studies. At these stages, 
potential conflicts between the goals of the authorities and those of the commercial companies 
can arise. Profits maximising interests of commercial companies would advocate the fastest 
and cheapest solution, i.e. an LNG solution or a pipeline in the exact capacity needed to 
transport gas from the fields in question. The system operator, in turn, considers the project 
from the network perspective, suggesting solutions with regard to market flexibility, reliability 
of supply and future infrastructure development. A pipeline solution is characterised by high 
economies of scale in investments, meaning low additional costs to establish overcapacity, 
which presents the potential for less costly expansion and the connection of new transport 
facilities in the future. The availability of a transport solution with spare capacity incentivises 
exploration in the region and reduces the cost threshold for the development of marginal fields. 
However, in light of a high required rate of return in the industry, delaying the investment 
decision or tying up capital in long-term low-return infrastructure investments above the 
needed capacity, are considered losses by a commercial company. The chosen solution is a 
                                               
4 Guidelines for plan for development and operation of a petroleum deposit (PDO) and plan for 
installation and operation of facilities for transport and utilisation of petroleum (PIO). The Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 4 February 2010. 
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consensus between short-term profit maximising objectives of commercial companies and 
long-term value creation maximising goals advocated by the system operator.  
The scope of the system operator’s responsibilities does not include assessing the impacts of 
an infrastructure project on the environment and society. The assessment of these effects is 
performed by a commercial company after the concept is selected. In order to ensure due 
attention to these effects, the relevant authorities evaluate the impact assessments. However, 
the existing appraisal procedures might disregard important socio-economic impacts at the 
concept selection stage. 
 
Figure 1.2 Gas transport infrastructure planning process 
The existing regulatory framework was organised with the intention of balancing the 
commercial interests of petroleum companies with socio-economic considerations. The 
involvement of the authorities at all stages of investment planning and appraisal is required to 
ensure this balance. However, the existing planning and appraisal system in the gas transport 
sector has room for improvement. The purpose of this thesis is to suggest analytical 
approaches to address the challenges arising in the investment planning and appraisal in the 
gas transport sector.  
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2 Research objectives 
Since the very beginning of the petroleum era, the Norwegian policymakers shared the view 
that the resources belong to the nation, and the development should benefit the whole society, 
including future generations. This goal is clearly formulated in the Petroleum Act, Section 1-2: 
‘. . . Resource management of petroleum resources shall be carried out in a long-term 
perspective for the benefit of the Norwegian society as a whole. . .’. The Norwegian model of 
petroleum sector governance is considered ‘canonical’ and is used as a benchmark by 
development institutions in countries with hydrocarbon resources (see, e.g., Thurber et al., 
2011; Lund, 2014). Various implications of the existing regulatory framework are covered in 
the academic literature. For instance, Hunter (2014) and Åm and Heiberg (2014) discuss how 
the Norwegian regulatory framework incentivises more effective oil and gas recovery. Holden 
(2013) and Mohn (2016) analyse Norway’s resource wealth management and fiscal policy. 
Extensive research exists on the impacts of petroleum activities on the environment, natural 
resources and Norwegian society. For example, Bakke et al. (2013) consider the 
environmental impacts and the risks associated with the discharge of produced water and drill 
cuttings from offshore oil and gas platforms. Blanchard et al. (2014) discuss the conflicts arising 
from routine petroleum operations, which impact marine ecosystems, and the uncertainties 
regarding the scale of the associated impacts. Gavenas et al. (2015) investigate the influence 
of a field’s age and size, the share of oil and in total reserves, and the carbon prices on CO2-
emission intensity of Norwegian oil and gas extraction. 
However, the aforementioned literature does not distinguish gas transportation in the general 
framework of the petroleum activities on the NCS. Nevertheless, the development and 
operation of the gas transportation network on the NCS receives considerable attention from 
the research community. The most widely used approach to analyse gas transport 
infrastructure development and operation is linear optimisation modelling. Among the first to 
explore the gas transportation problem is a study by Nygreen et al. (1998). The authors present 
a multi-period mixed integer programming model for long-term planning of petroleum 
production and transportation, with the emphasis on project scheduling. More recent examples 
include the paper by Rømo et al. (2009), which presents a decision support tool, GassOpt, 
also based on a mixed-integer program, optimising the network configuration and routing. 
Nørstebø et al. (2010) develop extensions to this model, which are related to the modelling of 
gas processing and compression, and analyse their impacts on system optimisation and 
operation. Hellemo et al. (2012) propose an investment analysis tool for natural gas 
infrastructure development, based on a deterministic mixed-integer linear program. The model 
extends the previous models by adding the pressure flow relationship and gas quality into the 
transportation system. Midthun et al. (2015) expand this model by allowing for continuous 
investment decisions, regarding the capacity of pipelines, processing facilities and 
compressors. Fodstad et al. (2015) present a modelling framework for analysing the use of 
interruptible transportation services to improve capacity utilisation in the natural gas 
transportation network.  
In addition, several studies use game-theoretic tools to analyse the interactions of parties 
involved in the development of upstream transport infrastructures. For example, Hagen et al. 
(2007) address the issue of optimal tariffs for natural gas transport. Sannarnes (2007) discuss 
how to design investment mechanisms to induce a socially optimal capacity increase in a gas 
transport network. Xu and Haugen (2008) investigate how the restructuring of the Norwegian 
gas transport system in 2002 changed the incentives of petroleum companies to invest in a 
new pipeline infrastructure. 
In the research mentioned above, the effect of the development and operation of the gas 
transport infrastructure on Norway’s social welfare is reflected through maximisation of the 
total surplus created in the industry. However, such an approach does not capture all the 
Essays on upstream gas transport infrastructure planning and appraisal ________________ 
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relevant socio-economic impacts, especially externalities of the infrastructure projects. A 
review of the existing literature reveals a gap: infrastructure development decisions are 
predominantly studied using optimisation techniques, while the related socio-economic 
aspects are mainly studied within a wider framework of petroleum activities on the NCS. This 
thesis contributes to filling this gap by emphasising the socio-economic perspective of gas 
transport infrastructure development in the Norwegian gas transport sector. 
An in-depth study of the regulatory framework and a broad survey on the appraisal of 
infrastructure projects in the Norwegian gas transport sector determined the scope of this 
research project. Three levels can be defined in the investment problem in the upstream gas 
transport sector (Figure 2.1). At the core of an infrastructure project is the need for a gas 
company to establish a transportation solution for certain gas discoveries. At this level, the new 
transport infrastructure is considered part of the field development projects. At the second 
level, the new infrastructure facility is considered part of the network, with regard to the long-
term value creation in the sector. The third level represents the social welfare perspective, 
which includes the impacts on third parties, i.e. those who are not directly involved in gas 
production and transportation. 
Figure 2.1 Levels of the investment problem in the gas transport sector 
The primary objective of this thesis was to develop a framework for comprehensive project 
appraisal in the upstream gas transport sector, which would internalise the economic impacts 
occurring at the three levels of the investment problem identified above. This objective is 
primarily addressed in Paper 1. The paper established the framework of the research project 
and raised several questions, which required a separate investigation. One such question was 
how to estimate the value of flexibility in gas pipeline investments within the comprehensive 
socio-economic analysis of an infrastructure project. The flexibility provided by excess pipeline 
capacity has long-term value for value creation in the gas sector, and is one of the most 
important aspects considered at the second level of the problem defined in Figure 2.1, but is 
disregarded on the project level. This issue is addressed in Paper 2. Another natural question, 
which is unavoidable in the context of investment planning, was the structure of the investment 
incentives in the sector. Paper 3 presents my understanding of this structure and investigates 
the relationship between the current tariff regime and the investment decisions taken in the 
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levels of the structure in Figure 2.1, and the particular role of the system operator in 
infrastructure development. Paper 4 contributes to the third level of the investment problem by 
investigating in detail the environmental externalities of gas transportation. 
 
3 Summary of the papers 
Paper 1, “Economic appraisal in the Norwegian gas transport sector”, investigates how 
the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methodology can be applied to the infrastructure development 
decisions in the upstream gas sector. We consider the main methodological aspects of CBA: 
the scope of analysis, the stakeholders, relevant impacts and uncertainty. We focus especially 
on the environmental externalities and the use of real options in CBA for valuations of flexibility 
in transport infrastructure investments. In order to investigate what CBA can contribute to the 
existing appraisal practice, we present a case study of the appraisal of a recent infrastructure 
project in the Norwegian gas transport sector, where the proposed method was used as a 
benchmark. The case study shows that some important socio-economic impacts can be 
missing or may not be evaluated explicitly in the existing appraisal practice. The proposed 
method provides a framework for comprehensive and systematic analysis of infrastructure 
projects, thereby providing decision support for concept selection. 
The paper is co-authored by Arild Hervik. A previous version of this paper was presented at 
the 27th annual NOFOMA (The Nordic Logistics Research Network) Conference, “Towards 
Sustainable Logistics and Supply Chain Management”, in Molde, Norway, 3–5 June 2015, and 
published in Jæger, B. (2015). NOFOMA 2015: Post Conference Proceedings, Molde, 3–5 
June 2015, Nordic Logistics Research Network, ISBN: 978-82-7962-207-9. The present 
version of the paper has been submitted to Energy Strategy Reviews.  
Paper 2, “Value of flexibility in gas pipeline investments”, develops one of the directions 
established in Paper 1 by focussing on the valuation of the flexibility in transport infrastructure 
investments and its importance for the decision making involved in infrastructure development. 
Investments in upstream gas transport pipelines are characterised by significant economies of 
scale: there is a low additional cost to establish capacity in excess of the committed volumes. 
The excess capacity provides flexibility for cost-efficient expansions of the transportation 
system if new discoveries are made in the future. The flexibility to expand the transportation 
network can be regarded as an option, which can be exercised in the event of new discoveries 
and when market conditions are favourable. The real options analysis provides a means to 
estimate the monetary value of flexibility in investments. In this paper, I review the existing 
approaches to real options valuations and identify those that can handle both market 
uncertainty and project-specific uncertainty, which are inherent to pipeline investments. An 
approach based on binomial matrices is chosen and applied to a simulated example of a 
pipeline project valuation. The paper also demonstrates how the value of flexibility provided by 
excess pipeline capacity can be used by a public decision maker in the evaluation of 
infrastructure projects in the Norwegian gas transport sector.   
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 20th Conference of the International 
Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS) in Barcelona, Spain, 13–18 July 2014. 
The paper was presented at the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL) in 
Hamburg, Germany, 24–25 September 2015. A shorter version is published in Kersten, W., 
Blecker, T. and Ringle, C.M. (2015). Innovations and Strategies for Logistics and Supply 
Chains. epubli GmbH, Berlin, ISBN: 978-3-7375-7805-9. 
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Paper 3, “Incentive problem in upstream gas transport infrastructure development”, 
investigates the interactions between the main parties involved in the infrastructure 
development. If the first two papers are devoted to the appraisal of gas transport infrastructure 
investments, this paper analyses the incentives under which these investments are 
undertaken. The objective of this paper is to build an analytical framework, which helps to 
structure and understand the interactions between the main parties involved in infrastructure 
investments under the existing tariff regime. Special emphasis is placed on the relative 
advantages of the LNG and pipeline solutions: the price premium due to the destination 
flexibility of the LNG and economies of scale in the pipeline investments, which enable over-
dimensioning of the pipelines with regard to future tie-ins. The interactions of the market 
players involved in upstream gas transport infrastructure development are investigated with 
the help of a game theoretic approach.  
This paper was presented at the ITQM (Information Technology and Quantitative 
Management) conference in Moscow, Russia, 3–5 June 2014. A shorter version is published 
in Procedia Computer Science (2014), 31, pp. 413–422, doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.05.285.  
Paper 4, “Environmental footprint of gas transportation: LNG vs. pipeline”, addresses one 
of the questions raised in Paper 1, which is related to the environmental externalities of 
infrastructure projects in the gas sector. The purpose of this paper was to estimate and 
compare the emissions to air caused by the extraction, processing and transportation of natural 
gas delivered from the NCS to markets via pipelines or in liquid form as LNG. Special 
consideration is given to the analysis of the environmental footprint of different pipeline chains 
depending on their configurations. The analysis substantiates the environmental superiority of 
pipeline chains over LNG-based chains. However, the comparative analysis of 10 pipeline 
chains highlights the significant variability of the environmental performance of pipeline 
transportation. The isolated analysis of the transportation segment of the value chains also 
confirms the superiority of pipeline transportation over LNG. In order to investigate the 
environmental aspect of gas transportation in light of the infrastructure development decisions 
on the NCS, we also separately consider the domestic parts of the transportation chains. 
This paper is co-authored by Arild Hervik and Harald Hjelle. The paper was presented at the 
39th conference of the International Association of Energy Economics (IAEE), in Bergen, 
Norway, 19-22 June 2016. It has been submitted to the Energy Journal. 
 
4 Further research 
Paper 1. The paper establishes a theoretical basis for CBA in the gas transport sector; 
however, a practical implementation of CBA requires additional research. One of the most 
important issues is the definition of an appropriate social discount rate for the analysis, which 
would reflect specific risks attributed to the petroleum sector. In the paper, we used the 
discount rate recommended for the socio-economic analysis of an ordinary public measure in 
Norway (NOU 2012:16). However, in gas transport infrastructure investments, the projects are 
funded by private capital, and this should be reflected in the choice of discount rate (Vickerman, 
2007). An interesting aspect is that part of the capital used for financing the infrastructure 
investments is provided by petroleum companies that are partially or totally state-owned. It 
adds a perspective of public-private partnership to the problem and offers an interesting 
direction for further research. 
Paper 2. The purpose of this paper was to consider how the real options framework can be 
used for valuation of excess pipeline capacity. As a point of departure, only one type of option 
 ________________________________________________________________ Introduction  
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is discussed, i.e. the option to expand the system up to full capacity of the pipeline in question. 
In practice, possibilities exist to expand the system step-wise by new tie-ins of different sizes, 
representing compound options. Options to expand represent strategic flexibility; however, 
excess pipeline capacity also provides some operational flexibility. For example, spare 
capacity in pipelines can be used as line-pack storage, which becomes an important back-up 
mechanism for gas producers to deliver contracted volumes in the event of interrupted 
production at platforms. In addition, options can be provided by compressor configurations and 
possibilities to redirect gas via gas hubs. The availability of a variety of approaches to option 
valuation with different levels of complexity, especially regarding gas prices, offers wide 
opportunities for further research.  
Paper 3. The paper proposes an analytical structure, which can be used for further analysis. 
The directions for further research are determined by the changing market conditions. 
Decreasing gas prices leads to the postponement of development decisions for many gas 
discoveries, and reduces the expected cash flow for gas transport infrastructure projects. The 
increased uncertainty over the prospects of recovering investment costs threatens the long-
term development of the transport infrastructure on the NCS. Instead of participating in new 
infrastructure projects, gas companies may postpone field developments until spare capacity 
becomes available in the existing pipelines. In addition, companies may be reluctant to disclose 
full information about their discoveries and the associated need for the transportation service. 
A direction for further research could be to incorporate the asymmetric information into the 
model of gas transport infrastructure development.  
Paper 4. The environmental aspect of gas production and transportation becomes increasingly 
important. A direction for further investigation may be to focus on the effects of carbon prices 
on the competitive position of Norwegian gas on the European market. Another research 
direction is prompted by the growing literature, particularly in the United States, on the methane 
leakage in gas production and distribution. Some studies (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2012; Schwietzke 
et al., 2014) claim that substituting new coal-fired power plants with new natural gas plants 
would result in short-term climate benefits only if the total net methane emission rates are less 
than 3%–4%. The transport of gas from the well to a distribution hub contributes significantly 
to the total methane leakage along the natural gas supply chain. This aspect may become 
important for the Norwegian gas sector as well in the near future. 
 
5 Methodologies in logistics research 
A research project of this type may be criticised for some methodological incoherence: how 
can a project that uses an economics methodology, which is mainly used to solve economic 
problems, be attributed to the discipline of logistics? A reasonable answer to this question 
requires a clear definition of logistics as a field of research. Several have attempted to give 
such a definition and identify the borders of the discipline (e.g., Stock, 1997; Arlbjørn and 
Halldorsson, 2002; Solem, 2003; Gammelgaard, 2004; Craighead et al., 2007; Bowersox; 
2007). However, logistics is still a relatively young and unsettled field (Klaus, 2009), and due 
to its interdisciplinary nature and the broad variety of research perspectives and related 
methodologies, no widely acknowledged understanding of logistics as an academic discipline 
currently exists. According to Stock (1997), the disciplines that provide logistics with theories 
and methods include accounting, business/management, computing, economics, marketing, 
mathematics, philosophy, political science, psychology and sociology. Each of the root 
disciplines emphasises a particular area of logistics, leading to the difficulty of finding a 
consensus regarding the borders of logistics as an academic discipline. 
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From the perspective of my research work, I support the understanding of logistics as a field 
of research proposed by the German Logistics Association (Delfman et al., 2010, p. 58): 
‘Logistics is an application-oriented scientific discipline. It models and analyses economic 
systems as networks and flows of objects through time and space (specifically goods, 
information, money, and people) which create value for people. . . . The scientific questions of 
the discipline relate primarily to the configuration, and organisation of these networks and to 
the mobilisation and control of flows’. The authors define five cornerstones to understand 
logistics as an academic discipline: 
(1) The network perspective. The distinctive approach of logistics is its interpretation of 
economic systems as networks and of economic processes as flows of objects such 
as goods, information, people and money. 
(2) Logistical inquiries on consecutive levels of aggregation. Any logistical issue can be 
interpreted as networks of flows, which may be regarded further as part of a higher-
level network.  
(3) Interdisciplinarity of logistics. Logistics uses methods from other disciplines, e.g. 
mathematics, engineering, economics and social sciences, but also develops them 
further. Interdisciplinarity is of central importance for logistics and is a central element 
of the logistics paradigm. 
(4) Unity within a variety of terminological, conceptual and methodological foundations of 
logistics, borrowed from various root disciplines, through the network model.  
(5) Application orientation of logistics. ‘As an application-oriented science, logistics seeks 
to primarily address problems and research questions that are faced in real-world 
economic activities. . . . It aims to contribute proactively to an ever deeper 
understanding of such problems and to provide relevant solutions’ (p. 61). 
These five cornerstones help to identify the position of this research project in the discipline of 
logistics. This is an application-oriented study; therefore, there is no ambition to develop new 
theories, but rather to adapt the existing ones to the solution of practical problems in the 
infrastructure planning and appraisal in the Norwegian gas transport sector. For the objectives 
of this study, the methodological framework of economics has been chosen, which is one of 
the disciplines that contributes most to logistics (Frankel et al., 2008). The unit of analysis in 
this research project is the network of gas pipelines on the NCS. The network perspective is 
the unifying feature of the four articles constituting the thesis. This study focuses on the 
investment planning and appraisal problems faced by expansions of the Norwegian gas 
transportation system, which can be characterised as macro logistics on the country level. The 
Norwegian gas pipeline network can be regarded at a higher aggregation level, as an upstream 
part of the European gas transport system. Taking into account the emerging LNG sector in 
Norway, it can even be regarded as part of the worldwide gas network. Thus, research on a 
higher aggregation level may be another direction for further investigation.  
To conclude the introduction, I submit that this thesis represents a humble attempt to contribute 
to the complex system of transport infrastructure planning and appraisal in the Norwegian gas 
sector by applying ‘logistics thinking’, which emphasises a holistic view of the problem. On the 
basis of empirical evidence, I have attempted to identify those aspects of the existing decision 
system that can be improved. In line with the methodological pluralism inherent to the discipline 
of logistics, I used different methodological approaches in each of the four papers, and 
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Investments in the upstream gas transport infrastructure are undertaken by commercial oil and 
gas companies on the basis of financial considerations. However, development decisions may 
have long-term effects on value creation in the gas sector and considerable external effects. 
This paper investigates how the methodology of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can be applied to 
infrastructure development decisions in the upstream gas transport sector. The proposed 
method enables the possibility of a systematic appraisal of the values of flexibility in the 
infrastructure investments and environmental externalities of gas transportation. In order to 
investigate what CBA can contribute to existing appraisal practices, we present a case study 
of the appraisal of a recent infrastructure project in the Norwegian gas transport sector. 
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Relatively low coal prices and carbon prices currently challenge the competitive position of 
natural gas in the European power market. However, it remains one of the main energy 
sources in the European energy mix: 21.4% of total energy consumption was covered by 
natural gas in 2014 (Eurostat, 2015). With a higher carbon price in the long run, natural gas is 
expected to gain more importance in the energy mix, as a transition fuel to a carbon-free 
economy, due to its abundance, cost competitiveness and low carbon footprint (53.07 kg CO2 
per MBtu) in comparison to coal (95.35 kg CO2 per MBtu) (EIA, 2016). While the importance 
of renewable energy has been increasing, natural gas plays an important role as a key provider 
of energy security. Against this backdrop, the EU has undertaken a number of initiatives to 
foster its natural gas market through the deployment of new cross-border infrastructure and 
the harmonization of market rules among its member states. In 2013, the European Parliament 
and Council adopted Regulation No. 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure (TEN-E Regulation), including electricity and gas transmission lines, electricity 
storage projects, underground gas storage projects and LNG terminals. The TEN-E Regulation 
establishes the principles relating to the identification of projects of common interest (PCI). 
PCIs should involve at least two member states, increase competition and enhance supply 
security and sustainability. Such projects would benefit from simplified licensing procedures, 
enhanced regulatory treatment and can receive financial support from the Connection Europe 
Facility. ENTSOG (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas) was 
appointed to develop an energy system-wide cost-benefit analysis (ESW-CBA) methodology 
for the selection of PCIs in the gas sector. This methodology, approved by the European 
Commission in 2015, evaluates the social welfare change at the aggregate EU level, 
instantiated by gas infrastructure projects. Focusing on the welfare of EU citizens, the 
methodology does not take into account the welfare change in producing counties (although 
an opportunity to evaluate the change in producers’ profits is provided). Earlier publications on 
CBA in the gas sector (e.g. CERRE, 2011; DNV KEMA et al, 2013) also focused only on 
European consumers. This paper addresses the evaluation of the effects of infrastructure 
projects in the upstream gas sector on the welfare of a gas producing country, using the 
Norwegian natural gas sector as an example (see e.g. Holden (2013) for a comprehensive 
overview of the Norwegian policy in the petroleum sector).  
The natural gas infrastructure on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is represented by a 
system of platforms, processing plants, receiving terminals and an extensive network of 
pipelines with a total length of about 8300 km and a transport capacity of 120 billion Sm3 per 
year. This transportation network connects gas producers on the shelf of Norway with markets 
in Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and France. About 95% of the gas produced on the 
NCS is transported via pipelines while the remaining five percent is shipped in liquid form by 
LNG (liquefied natural gas) carriers. 
The development of a new infrastructure is a matter of negotiations between petroleum 
companies that finance infrastructure development and authorities responsible for regulating 
and coordinating petroleum activities on the NCS. Three levels can be defined in the 
investment problem in the Norwegian gas transport sector. At the core is the need for gas 
companies to establish a transportation solution for their gas discoveries. The decision criterion 
at this level is to maximize the expected profits from these discoveries. At the second level are 
the effects of the project on the remainder of the infrastructure network as well as value 
creation on the NCS. The independent system operator, the state-owned company Gassco, is 
involved in investment planning to ensure that these effects are taken into consideration. The 
third level includes the effects on third parties – those that are not directly involved in gas 
production and transportation – for example, environmental externalities. The evaluation of 
 ___________________________ Economic appraisal in the Norwegian gas transport sector 
19 
these effects is left to gas companies, which apply for the statutory approval of projects. 
Evaluation of these impacts is not an integrated part of the economic appraisal of a project.  
The purpose of this paper is to suggest an approach for a comprehensive appraisal of 
infrastructure projects in the upstream gas transport sector from the perspective of a public 
decision-maker. We adapt the standard CBA methodology (see e.g. Boardman et al., 2013) 
for investment appraisal in the upstream gas sector and discuss the specificity of the 
assessment of relevant costs and benefits in the Norwegian economic and institutional 
environment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodological aspects of CBA 
implementation in upstream gas infrastructure projects. Section 3 presents a case study of the 
appraisal of a recent large infrastructure project on the Norwegian shelf using the proposed 
CBA framework as a reference point. Section 4 concludes. 
2 The CBA methodology in upstream gas infrastructure 
projects 
2.1 Literature review 
A survey of the academic literature on appraisal methodologies reveals relatively few examples 
relating to the upstream gas transport sector. As petroleum infrastructure development is 
usually a matter of private capital investments, the existing literature discusses evaluation 
approaches common in commercial decision-making. Macmillan (2000) investigates whether 
there are links between the use of decision analysis in investment appraisal and decision-
making by organisations and good business performance in the UK upstream oil and gas 
industry. Finch et al. (2002) investigate the extent to which formal and probabilistic appraisal 
and decision-making methodologies are adopted by companies in the UK upstream oil and 
gas sector. Dey (2002) addresses the problems of appraisal practice in the petroleum transport 
sector in India using the analytic hierarchy process as a technique. There is also a body of 
literature on environmental impact assessment in offshore hydrocarbon planning. Fidler and 
Noble (2012) provide a review of the research in this area and discuss the practice of strategic 
environmental assessment in the offshore oil and gas sector in Norway, Canada and the UK. 
The state of the literature reflects the industry practice, which can be characterized as a ‘two-
stage’ system: petroleum companies evaluate projects from the commercial perspective, and 
public authorities monitor the potential consequences of these projects on the natural 
resources and environment. This paper suggests a wider approach measuring the total change 
in social welfare from the implementation of a project.  
The CBA methodology is the most commonly used approach for economic appraisal of public 
decision-making in transport infrastructure appraisal (see e.g. Vickerman, 2007; Mackie et al., 
2014). There is extensive academic literature on CBA applications in the evaluation of public 
roads investments (see e.g. Salling and Banister, 2009; Damart and Roy, 2009; Holz-Rau and 
Scheiner, 2011), civil aviation (see e.g. Bråthen et al., 2000; Jorge and Rus, 2004), and 
railways (see e.g. Vickerman, 2000; Van Wee, 2007). To our knowledge, there is no academic 
literature focusing on CBA in the upstream gas transport sector.  
Norway has a long history of success implementation of CBA in economic appraisal within 
healthcare, transport infrastructure, public defence and other sectors (see e.g. Nyborg , 1998; 
Odeck, 2010, for discussion). The practical CBA framework for national use is subsumed within 
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guidelines by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2005, 2010 and 2014), which are based on 
several official Norwegian reports (Green papers NOU 1997:27 (Hervik et al., 1997), NOU 
1998:16 (Hervik et al., 1998) and NOU 2012:16 (Hagen et al., 2012)) devoted to the 
methodology and application of CBA. The method presented in this paper corresponds with 
these documents in order to ensure the consistency of the economic appraisal in the gas 
transport sector with other sectors in Norway.  
2.2 Scope of the analysis 
In the existing appraisal practice, a transport infrastructure project is mostly regarded as an 
aspect of the corresponding development of a gas field. The proposed method considers the 
infrastructure project separately from the field development, focusing particularly on the 
transportation chain. Under the term ‘transportation chain’, we understand the way in which 
the gas, extracted at an offshore field, is delivered to the market. A typical pipeline 
transportation chain includes the transportation of rich gas (a mix of methane and other 
gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons) from an offshore field to a processing facility onshore and 
the transportation of dry gas (almost pure methane) further to markets in Europe. An LNG 
transportation chain consists of three segments: liquefaction, sea shipping and re-gasification. 
We consider processing, i.e. the physical process of separating the wellstream into various 
components (methane, condensate, natural gas liquids), as part of natural gas production, and 
hence, we leave this out of the scope of a transport infrastructure project analysis.  
The development of a new transport infrastructure is triggered by a necessity to evacuate gas 
from proven gas reserves. However, the expected lifetime of a mid-sized gas field is 10–15 
years while the technical lifespan of a pipeline is up to 50 years. An economic analysis of a 
transportation solution should internalize the economic impacts that occur after the initial fields 
cease production. There are no universal recommendations regarding the analysis period in a 
CBA as it depends on the nature of the project and the sector in question. Hagen et al. (2012) 
states that, analyses must reflect the period during which the measures under consideration 
are actually in use or of service to society, highlighting that the main principle should be to 
bring the analysis period as close to the lifespan as practicable. We consider 40 years as a 
reasonable analysis period for an infrastructure project in the upstream gas sector due to the 
high uncertainty over the resource base and the absence of reliable forecasts after this period. 
A typical period between the concept selection and the beginning of the infrastructure operation 
is five years, meaning that the analysis period includes about 35 years of pipeline operations. 
In the discussion that follows, we refer primarily to the analysis of the two alternative logistical 
concepts of gas transportation: pipeline and LNG, which is in line with the ongoing discussion 
regarding the major infrastructure development in the Barents Sea (see e.g. Gassco, 2014). 
However, the analysis of alternatives may also be related to the choice of whether to process 
gas offshore or transport it onshore for processing, the choice of the landing point onshore or 
the choice of whether to connect the new infrastructure to the domestic network or to the 
network of another country (e.g. the UK). 
The purpose of a CBA is to measure the effects of a project on the social welfare of a country. 
A change in social welfare can be measured as a change in the total social surplus. Formally, 
under the competitive markets assumption, the change in the social surplus can be expressed 
as follows: ∆SS=∆CS+∆PS+∆GS, where ∆SS is the change in the social surplus; ∆CS is the 
change in consumer surplus; ∆PS is the change in producer surplus; and ∆GS is the change 
in governmental surplus.  
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For an export-oriented country like Norway (about 98% of the gas produced is exported), the 
effect on consumer surplus is negligible. Unlike most CBA applications, the main element of a 
CBA in the Norwegian gas sector is the change in producer surplus. This change can be 
measured as the effect of the project on the following four groups of stakeholders: (1) shippers 
in the new infrastructure; (2) investors in the new infrastructure; (3) shippers in the existing 
infrastructure and (4) owners of the existing infrastructure. In many cases, one company can 
be represented in each of the four groups. For example, in an LNG project, shippers and 
investors comprise the same companies; in a pipeline project, most of the potential shippers 
participate in the investments, at least in the initial stages (the participating interest in the 
pipeline infrastructure can be sold at later stages, or institutional investors can participate in 
the project from the beginning). Therefore, in order to structure the analysis, this provisional 
classification of stakeholders can be regarded as a classification of the different roles of 
companies in a project. 
The change in governmental surplus is determined by government spending on a project and 
the income generated. On the NCS, there is neither direct public funding of infrastructure 
projects nor direct tariff income from the transport infrastructure for the government. However, 
the state indirectly participates in infrastructure investments via the major Norwegian gas 
producer, Statoil (67% state ownership) and the state-owned company Petoro. The task of 
Petoro is to manage the holdings of the Norwegian state in production licences and associated 
facilities on the NCS. Petoro acts as a licensee on behalf of the state and participates in 
infrastructure investments proportional to its shares in the corresponding gas fields. Through 
this participation interest, the state receives the tariff income from the infrastructure use. In the 
proposed CBA framework, these effects are captured in the evaluation of the change in 
producer surplus. Another major revenue source for the government is corporate tax on the 
petroleum activities on the NCS. In a CBA, cash flow is calculated before tax as corporate 
taxes represent a cash flow redistribution.  
In a perfectly competitive market situation, the formula mentioned above would capture the 
total welfare change. However, there are externalities in gas transport infrastructure projects – 
direct effects on third parties – for example, environmental impacts, impacts on fisheries and 
shipping and other effects on primary markets. Third parties represent the fifth group of 
stakeholders in the proposed methodology. Infrastructure projects in the gas sector may also 
have effects on secondary markets: methanol production, electricity market, labour market and 
regional economic activity. In this paper, we refer to a welfare function whose scope is limited 
to the gas production and transportation sector and leave the effects on secondary markets 
out of the scope of this paper on the basis of the efficient markets assumption (Boardman et 
al., 2013).  
 
2.3 Relevant impacts 
As the scope of analysis is limited to gas transport infrastructure projects, the revenue from 
the sales of dry gas and natural gas liquids and the corresponding production costs are 
excluded from the analysis. However, if an LNG alternative is considered, the value of the 
destination flexibility provided by the possibility of shipping the gas to the highest value markets 
(a price premium) should be included as a benefit for shippers (for a methodology on real 
option valuations of LNG destination flexibility, see e.g. Rodríguez, 2008). The cost for shippers 
of using a new pipeline are represented by the tariffs paid for the use of this new infrastructure 
as well as for the transportation of gas in the existing infrastructure downstream. The LNG 
transportation chain does not imply any regulated tariffs; the costs for shippers are related to 
the liquefaction of gas and sea shipping. 
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Another important aspect of the evaluation of impacts on shippers in the new infrastructure 
relates to the technical aspects of the pipeline transportation. Gas moves along pipelines due 
to the pressure produced by compressors installed at the pipeline entries, for the upstream 
pipelines – at the offshore platforms. The capacity and technical characteristics of these 
compressors are determined by the technical characteristics of the pipeline. In fact, these 
compressors are part of the pipeline transportation chain. However, export compressors are 
considered part of the field infrastructure. The cost of these compressors and of the energy 
required for their operation are attributed to the cost of the field development and operation 
and are not considered within the evaluation of transport infrastructure projects. When a 
pipeline solution is compared to an LNG solution, which does not require compression, the 
export compressors and the energy for their operation become a natural part of the transport-
related costs, in addition to the tariffs paid to the pipeline owners.  
The impacts on new pipeline infrastructure investors are the investment costs and the expected 
income from the transportation tariffs. On the NCS, the transportation tariff consists of a capital 
element and an operating element.5 The capital element paid by the shippers is transferred to 
the infrastructure owners while the operating element covers the costs of operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure. In the case of an LNG alternative, the cost for investors is the 
investment in LNG tankers and a liquefaction facility.  
The inflow of gas from a new pipeline infrastructure affects the shippers and owners of the 
existing network. A higher volume of gas in the pipeline system may reduce the unit cost of 
transportation, in turn reducing the operating element of the tariff and rendering cost savings 
to all shippers. The owners of the existing infrastructure may experience revenue increases 
through the capital element of the tariff paid for the transportation of the volumes of gas from 
the new infrastructure.  
The remainder of the Norwegian society is affected by the externalities of gas infrastructure 
projects. Many of these effects, for example, the distortion of fisheries and shipping, occur only 
during the construction of facilities and are often of a limited scale. The environmental impacts 
(emissions to air and sea and landscape impacts) occur both during the construction stage 
and normal operations. The construction and preparation of the facilities for operation generate 
emissions to air from installation equipment and vessels. Emissions of cooling and ballast 
waters to the sea occur during the installation and spillage of chemicals during the cleaning 
and testing of pipelines. The impacts on the landscape are related to the construction of 
processing plants onshore. Impacts on sea flora and fauna can be caused by the damage of 
corals by anchors as well as the disturbance of fish and sea birds during construction. 
Disturbances by noise and light on nearby dwellings can be caused during operations. Most 
of these impacts are of a very limited nature, and many of them are not directly quantifiable. 
However, in cases in which these effects are not negligible, they should be internalized in the 
analysis according to the social value (e.g. Aanesen et al. (2015) provide estimates of the 
willingness-to-pay for preserving cold-water corals in Norway). 
During normal operations, the main environmental impacts from the transport infrastructure 
are emissions to air caused by energy production. Export compression relating to pipeline 
transportation and gas liquefaction in an LNG chain requires large amounts of energy, which 
in many cases is generated by gas turbines, causing significant CO2 and NOx emissions. Due 
to the technological specificity of LNG facilities, there may also be considerable methane 
leakage. Alternative pipeline solutions may also have significantly different environmental 
footprints, depending on the possibility of connecting the offshore facilities to the main 
electricity grid onshore. Shaton et al. (2016) estimate emissions to air from the alternative 
                                               
5 Regulations relating to stipulation of tariffs, etc. for specific facilities, 20 December 2002, No. 1724 
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transportation chains on the NCS. Besides displaying a variety of the footprints of different 
pipeline chains and the significant superiority of the pipeline transportation over the LNG, the 
study also shows that transportation-related emissions constitute a considerable component 
of the total emissions by the gas sector. It should be noted that the costs of CO2 and NOx 
emissions are partially internalized in the existing appraisal practice through the corresponding 
taxes included in the cost calculations. However, the existing tax system does not necessarily 
reflect the social value of these emissions. In such cases, the eventual difference between the 
social values and the taxes paid should be accounted for in the economic analysis of 
infrastructure projects. 
The priced impacts need to be discounted by the social rate in order to calculate the net 
economic benefits of a project. A discussion on the derivation of the appropriate social discount 
rate is left out of the scope of this paper. For further analysis, we use the a social discount rate, 
recommended for the socio-economic analysis of an ordinary public measure in Norway by 
Hagen et al. (2012).6 
 
2.4 Uncertainty  
One approach to treating uncertainty is to add a risk premium to the discount rate. An 
alternative is to use certainty equivalents in the analysis and discount them using a risk-free 
discount rate (Boardman et al., 2013). The first approach is used in the practice of the impact 
assessment in the sector whereby a risk premium of two or three percent is used. This 
approach may be considered as a simplification. A more elaborate approach would be to 
consider project-specific sources of uncertainty separately and apply suitable techniques to 
deal with them while applying a risk-free rate for cash flow discounting. Uncertainty over 
investment costs, for example, can be treated by means of expected values. However, this 
approach is not appropriate for the uncertainty regarding the utilisation rate of the planned 
facilities. 
The expected production rate is a critical factor in decision-making regarding the concept 
selection of an infrastructure solution, especially the capacity of facilities. It is determined 
mainly by two uncertain parameters: the gas prices and the rate of exploration success. In 
planning an infrastructure, petroleum companies focus on particular fields, with a reasonably 
well defined resource volume. Therefore, the dynamics of gas prices and potential contractual 
agreements determine their need for transport capacity. The independent system operator 
involved in infrastructure planning takes a long-term perspective and accounts for possible 
discoveries and future tie-ins in the system. For the system operator, exploration success is 
the focal uncertainty factor.  
We consider a case in which the capacity of a pipeline which connects a new area with the 
existing network is being decided. The tariff system on the NCS is arranged by zones. A new 
project of this type will comprise a new zone, with a tariff set up by the regulator independently 
from the remainder of the network. The existing tariff system is based on the rate-of-return 
regulation, which allows the recovery of the investment cost within the license period. 
Therefore, the tariff can be approximated as a long-run average cost (LRAC) of transportation. 
The Norwegian gas transport system is a natural monopoly facing increasing returns to 
capacity, which implies that the LRAC curve is downward-sloping (Church and Ware, 2000). 
                                               
6 The NOU 2012:16 Green Paper recommends a real risk-adjusted discount rate of four percent for 
effects in the first 40 years, three percent from 40 to 75 years and two percent for subsequent years. 
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The demand for the transportation service (D) is driven by two parameters, the demand for 
gas and the production rate, which depends on the exploration success. We assume that all 
the Norwegian gas produced will be sold; thus, the demand for transportation is considered 
from the perspective of proven gas resources and possible discoveries. An infrastructure 
project is initiated by gas companies in order to establish means for evacuating the gas from 
their gas fields (a committed volume). In the planning horizon of gas companies, their demand 
for the transportation service is fixed. In Figure 2.1, the short-term demand for the 
transportation service, D0, is represented by a vertical line. The gas companies propose a 
pipeline solution (a ‘0-alternative’) with a capacity of C0, corresponding to the committed 
volume of V0. This capacity implies an LRAC0 curve. The tariff (T) would be set at the level t0.  
Figure 2.1 The short-run demand for transportation services 
The system operator considers the new infrastructure from the long-term perspective and 
takes into account possible new discoveries in the area above the committed volumes. Figure 
2.2 depicts a situation in which the system operator suggests a pipeline solution (‘alternative-
1’) with capacity C1, on the basis of its medium resource scenario. A solution with a higher 
capacity requires higher investment costs and implies the long-run average cost curve LRAC1. 
The long-run demand curve D1 is downward sloping: the transportation tariff will affect 
decisions to develop new fields in the area. However, the long-term demand is rather inelastic 
down to a certain tariff level; thus, for major and mid-sized developments, the tariff level may 
not be a decisive factor. The development of marginal fields is more sensitive to transportation 
costs. Below a certain tariff level, the cost threshold for the development of marginal fields is 
surpassed, and demand becomes more elastic.  
In a short-term perspective, the cost function LRAC1 suggests a higher tariff, t1, due to the 
higher initial investment. However, if the medium-resource scenario occurs, the tariff is 
established at a lower level, t1*, and the volume transported increases to V1. 
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Figure 2.2 The long-run demand, medium resource scenario 
The system operator also considers possibilities of low and high resource scenarios. If the high 
resource scenario occurs, the capacity of ‘alternative-1’ is not sufficient in the long run, and a 
new transport solution may be required, or resource development may be postponed until there 
is available capacity in the established solution – both outcomes mean some welfare loss. 
Therefore, the operator considers the solution of capacity C2 (‘alternative-2’), which implies the 
cost curve LRAC2 (Figure 2.3). If there are significant discoveries in the area, the demand 
function shifts to the right, and its elastic component begins at a higher tariff (meaning that in 
addition to large discoveries, many smaller deposits have been discovered with a lower cost 
threshold than before). If the second alternative is selected, the new tariff t2* could be 
established at the first intersection of the demand function with the cost curve; the volume 
transported would then be V2*. However, the demand curve crosses the cost curve LTAC2 
again after the kink. This means that the tariff t3 established at the intersection of the cost curve 
with the capacity limit would motivate the development of the marginal fields up to the transport 
capacity limit C2.  
The problem with ‘alternative-2’ is that if the medium resource scenario occurs, the tariff would 
be established at level t2, implying the volume of transported gas V2, which is lower than the 
corresponding volume V1 if ‘alternative-1’ is chosen. If there are no new significant discoveries 
in the area at all – a low resource scenario occurs, and the demand for the transportation 
service does not increase – the tariff should be even higher in order to recover the investment 
costs.  
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Figure 2.3 The long-run demand, high resource scenario 
According to the standard CBA methodology, such uncertainty should be dealt with using the 
expected values or a scenario analysis. However, a solution with excess capacity may be 
regarded as a solution with additional flexibility, which cannot be captured in the standard NPV 
calculation. Pre-investments in additional capacity provide opportunities to expand production 
in the future and connect new fields if the market conditions are favourable. Such flexibility has 
significant socio-economic value in the long run, which should be weighted upon the tariff 
increase due to a higher investment cost. This approach calls for the use of real options in a 
CBA: the value of flexibility should be added to the benefits of a solution with excess capacity. 
Shaton (2015) suggests a methodology for real option valuations of the flexibility provided by 
excess capacity in gas transport infrastructure investments and shows that this value can 
influence decisions in favour of the pipeline alternative with upfront investments.  
 
2.5 Structure of a CBA 
Figure 2.4 summarizes the discussion so far and presents a general structure of a CBA for a 
case in which an LNG solution is compared with a pipeline solution with excess capacity with 
regard to future tie-ins (the LNG chain has no economies of scale in investments).  
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Figure 2.4 The structure of a CBA of an infrastructure project in the upstream gas sector 
The CBA approach provides a framework for a comprehensive economic analysis of a gas 
transport infrastructure project, which includes the impacts on all three levels of the investment 
problem. At the project level, we consider the costs and benefits occurring to the shippers and 
investors in the new infrastructure. The NPV calculation at this level (though with a shorter 
analysis period and a higher discount rate) represents the view of the project by the petroleum 
companies involved.  
The second level of analysis includes all impacts of an infrastructure project relating to value 
creation in the gas sector such as the tariff impacts on the shippers and owners of the existing 
network and the value of flexibility provided by excess pipeline capacity. In fact, the savings in 
operating costs in the existing network for the shippers and the tariff income for the owners 
(the benefits at the second level) are provided by the tariffs paid by the shippers in the new 
infrastructure for the use of the downstream network (the costs on the first level). It means that 
these two groups of effects will be nullified in the outcome of the analysis. However, the 
consideration of the impacts on the existing infrastructure is especially important when a 
pipeline solution is compared to an LNG solution, which has no impact on the rest of the 
network. The NPV calculation at this level represents the perspective of the system operator, 
which coordinates all infrastructure planning on the NCS.  
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The third level adds the environmental externalities to the picture and completes the economic 
analysis of a project.  
Certainly, the results of such an analysis should be subject to a sensitivity analysis with respect 
to the main uncertainty parameters: investment costs, gas and carbon prices, LNG shipping 
costs, regularity of transportation and liquefaction facilities.  
In the next section, we discuss a recent infrastructure project on the NCS, through the lenses 
of the analytical framework presented above, in order to determine what CBA can add to the 
existing appraisal practice.  
 
3 Case study 
3.1 Case description 
The Polarled pipeline project (planned start in 2017, formerly called the Norwegian Gas 
Transport Infrastructure – NSGI) was triggered by the need for an export solution for the Aasta 
Hansteen field (operated by Statoil) in the Norwegian Sea (Figure 3.1). The following 
alternatives were initially considered: a direct 500 km rich gas pipeline to the onshore plant at 
Nyhamna for processing and further transport to the market via the export pipeline Langeled; 
a new onshore processing facility in geographical proximity to the field with two possible export 
solutions, either LNG or further connection to Nyhamna; a connection to the existing 
processing facility at Tjeldbergodden, which processes gas for domestic use, and a floating 
LNG solution. The LNG solution was rejected because it was technically impossible within the 
established timeframe as well as the high uncertainty over the cost of such a solution. The 
connection to Tjelbergodden was rejected because the expected volume of gas from the fields 
in question exceeded domestic demand; an export solution would thus be needed. The 
alternative of a new processing plant onshore was ruled out because of much higher 
investment costs in comparison to the direct connection to Nyhamna (the estimated costs were 
65 and 25 billion 2012-NOK for LNG and a further connection to Nyhamna, respectively, and 
10 billion 2012-NOK for the direct pipeline to Nyhamna, NOK8.5 ≈ €1).  
The solution with a direct pipeline to Nyhamna was also attractive because of available spare 
capacity at the Nyhamna plant and in the export pipeline system Langeled. This alternative 
made it possible to connect the Linnorm (operated by Norske Shell) and Zidane (operated by 
RWE Dea Norge)7 fields and establish a tie-in to another rich gas pipeline, Åsgard Transport. 
The prospects of a combined solution and possibility for new discoveries in the area motivated 
the consideration of a pipeline of 28'' to 40'' and a capacity of 35 to 85 MSm3/d. 
                                               
7 The development decisions for these two fields have been postponed, but the owners are 
participating in the pipeline project. 
 ___________________________ Economic appraisal in the Norwegian gas transport sector 
29 
Figure 3.1 Map of the pipelines on the Norwegian shelf. The Polarled pipeline is denoted by 
the densely dotted line (Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate).  
The system operator Gassco was responsible for the project up to the concept selection (a 36'' 
rich gas pipeline with a capacity up to 70 MSm3/d from the Aasta Hansteen field to the 
processing plant at Nyhamna). At that point, the operatorship of the project for the construction 
phase was delivered to Statoil, which prepared the plan for installation and operation and the 
respective impact assessment of the pipeline project. The project required an expansion of the 
Nyhamna processing plant. Shell, the plant operator, was responsible for the plan and the 
impact assessment of the expansion.  
3.2 Results 
The appraisal of the Polarled project is represented by several publicly available documents. 
The two principal documents are the plans and impact assessments of the installation and 
operation of the Polarled pipeline and of the expansion of the Nyhamna processing plant 
(2012). Some information relating to the pipeline project is also presented in the plans and 
impact assessments of the development and operation of the gas fields Aasta Hansteen, 
Linnorm and Zidane. The impact assessment of the Polarled pipeline covers the impacts 
relating to the pipeline itself and does not include impacts from the compressors installed at 
the pipeline entries and those relating to the connection of the pipeline to the onshore plant. 
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The first set of impacts is included in the impact assessments of the corresponding fields while 
the other set is included in the impact assessment of the plant expansion. The system operator 
Gassco also performed its own evaluation of the project; however, the relevant reports are not 
publicly available. In the analysis that follows, we refer to the CBA structure provided in Section 
2.5 and consider which parts can be recovered from the available documents while seeking to 
determine which parts are missing.  
According to the proposed structure, the impacts on shippers in a pipeline are the tariffs and 
costs associated with gas compression. In the appraisal practice, the tariffs are included in the 
profitability assessments of the fields; the cost of compressors are considered as part of the 
field infrastructure costs; and the energy used for running the compressors is considered as 
part of the operating costs of the field. Thus, the impacts on shippers can be recovered from 
the information provided on the field developments, and we can conclude that in this way, 
these impacts are actually internalized in the appraisal practice. However, this will cover only 
part of the analysis period. The expected lifetime of Aasta Hansteen is nine years, Linnorm is 
15 years, and Zidane is 10 years, meaning that the effects occurring after the initial fields have 
ceased operation are missing in the appraisal picture.  
The impacts on the investors are the investment costs and tariff revenue. In the documents 
relating to the Polarled pipeline and plant expansion, only the cost side is evaluated; the 
revenue aspect is not covered. According to the petroleum regulation,8 the capital element is 
stipulated such that it should bring a ‘reasonable return on investments’, which has been at the 
level of seven percent thus far. In the appraisal practice, a seven percent discount rate is used; 
therefore, the effect on the investors is nullified. In performing a CBA, we would use a social 
discount rate of four percent, recommended by Hagen et al. (2012). This means that investors 
will receive profits from the project during the license period (typically about 30 years), which 
is also missing in the appraisal picture. Due to the absence of the data on the tariff in the new 
infrastructure, we cannot estimate these effects.  
The plans and impact assessments discussed above are project-specific and are not intended 
to cover a wider perspective; therefore, they do not consider the effects on the existing network. 
We attempt to estimate the impacts on the shippers and owners of the existing network on the 
basis of the publicly available data on the tariffs on the NCS. 
The gas transported via the Polarled will be exported via the Langeled pipeline system after 
being processed at Nyhamna. This pipeline system is part of the tariff zone ‘Area D’. This zone 
includes all dry gas pipelines that deliver sales gas to the receiving terminals in continental 
Europe and the UK. In 2012, the unit operating cost of transportation in Area D was 0.0203558 
NOK/Sm3. The total volume of gas transported in Area D is about 100 billion Sm3 annually, 
and an inflow of gas from Polarled may account for an additional 15 billion Sm3 annually. 
According to our consultations with industry experts, this inflow will not change the total 
operating costs in Area D. This means that the unit operating cost will be reduced. An 
approximate calculation yields 265 million NOK in annual savings for other shippers. 
Discounting this number over the analysis period, the total saving for shippers in the existing 
network amounts to 4.22 billion 2012-NOK. 
The shippers of the Polarled gas will also pay the capital element of the transportation tariff in 
Area D until 2028 when the license for this infrastructure expires. In 2012, the capital element 
for the UK and continental exits in Area D was 0.0679003 NOK/Sm3. A year later, it was 
reduced by 90%. This was a transition from long-run average cost-based tariffs to short-run 
average cost-based tariffs because the rate of return on this infrastructure had already 
8 Regulations to the Act relating to petroleum activities, 27 June 1997, No. 65. 
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achieved seven percent, and the investment cost had been recouped. It is unclear which of 
the two tariffs would have been used for such calculations back in 2012 when the project was 
evaluated. Discounting over the license period, there is the additional revenue of 12.22 billion 
for the 2012 tariffs and 1.22 billion for the 2013 tariffs for the existing infrastructure owners.  
Supposedly, these two sets of impacts are considered within the system operator’s evaluation 
of the project. We can conclude that these impacts are also internalized in the decision-making 
although they are not explicitly estimated.  
The third impact considered at this level of analysis is the value of flexibility provided by excess 
pipeline capacity. In practice, this value is also not explicitly estimated, but the choice of the 
solution for this project (a pipeline with a capacity of 70 MSm3/day while the committed volumes 
are not more than 44 MSm3/day) indicates that, implicitly, this value is also internalized in the 
appraisal practice. 
The participation of the system operator in investment planning ensures that the economic 
impacts of a project on the value creation in the sector are internalized in the decision-making. 
However, the scope of the system operator’s responsibilities does not include the external 
effects of infrastructure projects. These effects are only evaluated within the impact 
assessments performed by gas companies when the final solution is selected.  
In the impact assessment of the construction and operation of the Polarled pipeline, the 
environmental impacts were characterised as insignificant. The emissions of CO2 and NOx 
during the construction and preparation of the pipeline were estimated at 44,290 and 976 
tonnes, respectively. The emissions during the normal operation were limited to the emissions 
from vessels associated with inspections, supplement rock dumping and eventual reparations 
of the pipeline, and were characterized as negligible. In order to estimate the emissions relating 
to the compression of gas for transportation in the Polarled pipeline, we used the data in the 
impact assessments of the field developments.  
The impact assessment for Aasta Hansteen provides the total average yearly emissions: 
250,000 tonnes of CO2 and 210 tonnes of NOx. However, the data on the allocation of these 
emissions between the emission sources (turbines, flares, engines, other emissions) is not 
provided. The reported emissions from the fields operating on the NCS indicate that turbines 
account for about 90% of total emissions (e.g. 90.2% for Norne; 88.78 for Snorre; and 90.18 
for Kristin in 2014). The two gas turbines installed at the Aasta Hansteen platform will generate 
a total of 43–54 MW of electricity to supply energy to all processes on the platform; out of this 
total, 31–43 MW will be required for export compression. Based on this information, we 
estimate the transportation-related emissions at Aasta Hansteen as 72% of the total (Table 
3.1). 
The impact assessment of the Linnorm field development provides separate emissions-related 
information on compression. The export compressor will be installed at the Draugen platform, 
which, according to the plan, will receive, process and compress the Linnorm gas before 
sending it to the Polarled pipeline. The compressor will generate about 90,000 tonnes of CO2 
annually, which is 82% of the total emissions related to this field, and about 50 tonnes of NOx 
a year.  
According to the Zidane impact assessment, the energy for the field will be produced at the 
Heidrun platform, which will process the gas from Zidane. The average yearly emissions at 
Heidrun in relation to the Zidane operations will be 50,000 tonnes of CO2 and 25 tonnes of 
NOx. As the data on the distribution of these emissions between the processes is not available, 
we used the 80% estimate for the share of the transportation-related emissions, in line with the 
data for Linnorm, based on the similarity of the development concepts. 
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Estimated CO2 emissions from 
compression, tonne per year 
Estimated NOX emissions, 
tonne per year 
Aasta Hasteen 22 180,000 150 
Linnorm 13 90,000 50 
Zidane 8 40,000 20 
Total 44 310,000 220 
Table 3.1 shows that the export compression of gas from the three fields, which were slated 
for connection to the Polarled pipeline, would cause annual emissions of 310,000 tonnes of 
CO2 and 220 tonnes of NOx. The production volumes from these three fields can fill up to 63% 
of the pipeline capacity. Active exploration activity in the areas close to the Polarled pipeline 
allows the conservative assumption that the utilization rate will increase up to 80% after the 
first ten years of the pipeline’s operation (the current utilization of the closest rich gas pipeline 
– Åsgard Transport – is nearly 100%). Assuming a linear relationship between the gas volume 
needed to be compressed and the emissions by gas turbines running the compressors, at 80% 
utilization of the pipeline, the annual CO2 and NOx emissions will be 394,000 and 280 tonnes, 
respectively. During the 40 years of the analysis period, which includes 35 years of pipeline 
operation under the above-described utilization scenario, the total emissions relating to the 
Polarled pipeline (including construction and operation) are 12,985,563 tonnes of CO2 and 
10,060 tonnes of NOx.9  
In order to estimate the cost of the environmental externalities from gas transportation in the 
Polarled pipeline, we used the calculation prices used in Norway for public roads infrastructure 
projects (Table 3.2) and adjusted them based on environmental taxes paid by companies. 
Table 3.2 Norwegian calculation prices of CO2 and NOx emissions in 2012 
 2009-NOK per tonne of CO2 2009-NOK per kg of NOx 
2015 210 50 
2020 320 50 
2030 and further 800 50 
Source: Institute of Transport Economics (Magnussen et al., 2010) 
According to Prop. 1 LS (2011-2012), the tax for the continental shelf of natural gas was 209 
NOK per tonne of CO2 and 16.69 NOK per kg of NOx in 2012. Due to the fact that a substantial 
part of CO2 emissions in the sector was covered by the Allowance Trading scheme, the price 
paid by companies for a tonne of emitted CO2 was about 250 NOK. With all prices adjusted to 
the CPI, and using the social discount rate of four percent, we obtained the cost of the 
environmental externality of 3.14 billion 2012-NOK (2.98 billion for CO2 and 0.16 billion for 
NOx). 
 
                                               
9 During the 50 years of the expected lifetime of the pipeline: 18,846,032 tonnes of CO2 and 13,375 
tonnes of NOx. 
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3.3 Discussion 
The case study of the Polarled project shows that the existing appraisal system internalizes 
most of the economic impacts of infrastructure projects. However, the assessment of these 
impacts is scattered between the parties participating in a project and are often evaluated 
indirectly. The proposed CBA method provides a framework for a systematic and 
comprehensive analysis. Summarizing the findings of the case study, we can define the 
following potential contributions of CBA to the existing appraisal practice.  
The proposed approach focuses on the transportation solution, separating the transport 
infrastructure project from field developments. The analysis includes all components of the gas 
value chain relating to the transportation of gas. In particular, we consider export compression, 
which in practice is considered part of the field infrastructure, as a part of the pipeline 
transportation chain; and consider liquefaction as part of the LNG transportation chain. 
The effects on the shippers and owners of the new infrastructure are captured in the existing 
practice in the evaluation of the fields, which are initially associated with an infrastructure 
project. However, the lifespan of the initial fields is typically shorter than that of the transport 
infrastructure. The CBA approach also internalizes the impacts on shippers and owners which 
occur after the initial fields cease production. Besides considering the impacts within a longer 
analysis period, we discount the cash flows with a social discount rate. This reveals the effects 
that are nullified under the commercial discounting.  
The impacts on the shippers and owners of the rest of the network are implicitly internalized in 
the decision-making due to the participation of the system operator in investment planning. 
However, these impacts are not explicitly estimated. The case study indicates that their scale 
is considerable; for example, the operating cost savings for shippers in the existing network 
were 2012-NOK 4.22 billion while the expected investment cost was about 10 billion. The CBA 
provides a framework for a systematic appraisal of these impacts within the project analysis.  
The proposed structure also internalizes values of flexibility in the infrastructure investments. 
These are the destination flexibility of the LNG solution, which allows the shipping of gas to the 
highest value markets, and the strategic flexibility provided by excess pipeline capacity, which 
provides possibilities for future tie-ins.  
An important contribution of the proposed method is the analysis of external effects. The costs 
of environmental impacts associated with gas transportation are partially internalized in the 
existing practice via the environmental taxes included in the operating cost calculations. In the 
CBA, these impacts are assessed according to their social value. Furthermore, we estimate 
the environmental externalities over the whole analysis period, beyond the lifetime of the initial 
gas fields. The estimates provided in the case study show that emissions to air associated with 
pipeline transportation are significant when the entire transportation chain is taken into 
consideration; and the cost of this environmental externality is an important aspect of a 
comprehensive economic analysis of a project.  
 
4 Conclusions and policy implications  
Investments in upstream gas transport infrastructure are undertaken by commercial oil and 
gas companies that make final investment decisions and take investment risk. However, an 
infrastructure project may have long-term effects on the existing gas transport network and 
overall value creation in the sector. Moreover, infrastructure development may have 
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externalities. The regulatory framework in the Norwegian gas sector is organised such that 
commercial interests are balanced with socio-economic considerations. In gas transport 
infrastructure development, this is achieved through the participation of the system operator in 
project planning and concept choice as well as project assessment by relevant before statutory 
approval. The infrastructure development decisions taken on the NCS so far reflect the fact 
that the effects on value creation in the gas sector and the effects on third parties are, to some 
extent, implicitly taken into account in decision-making. However, some important socio-
economic impacts can be missing or may not be explicitly evaluated in the existing appraisal 
practice. The proposed CBA method offers a framework for a comprehensive economic 
analysis of infrastructure projects in the upstream gas sector. The introduction of CBA does 
not require structural changes of the established planning and appraisal procedures; it can be 
regarded as a missing link in the existing practice and can play a coordinating role in planning 
and appraisal.  
This paper discusses the application of CBA in the Norwegian upstream gas transport sector, 
however, it can be used in the gas sectors of other gas producing countries. The proposed 
methodology can be adjusted in correspondence with the specificity of the institutional 
environment or peculiar properties of a project.  
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Investments in upstream gas pipelines are characterised by significant economies of scale: 
low additional costs are required to establish capacity in excess of the committed volumes. 
The excess capacity provides flexibility for cost-efficient expansions of the transportation 
system in the event of future discoveries. Therefore, investments in excess pipeline capacity 
may have a significant effect on the value creation in the gas sector in the long run. Flexibility 
to expand the transportation network can be regarded as an option to be exercised if there are 
new discoveries and market conditions are favourable. The objective of this paper is to 
consider how real options thinking can be applied to estimate the monetary value of the 
flexibility provided by investments in excess capacity in upstream gas pipelines. The proposed 
approach is based on binomial lattices, allowing for the inclusion of both market and project-
specific risks in the evaluation. The provided example demonstrates how this value can be 
used by a public decision-maker in the evaluation of infrastructure projects in the Norwegian 
gas transport sector.   
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1 Introduction 
Critical elements of the efficient functioning of natural gas markets is access to gas transport 
infrastructures and the cost of using them. This relates both to the upstream, or producer, level 
and to the downstream, or consumer, level. However, the goals and decision criteria for gas 
transport infrastructure development differ between these two levels. Thus, major 
infrastructure development projects in the consumer-oriented European Union (EU) gas sector 
are associated with such policy objectives as market integration, security of supply, 
competition and sustainability, e.g. Regulation (EU) No 347/2013, and include the 
development of interconnectors between the national gas networks, liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) terminals and gas storage facilities. Infrastructure development decisions in the 
upstream gas sector have a different nature. First, such decisions largely depend on 
economics and technical characteristics of the field development projects that trigger the 
development of the transport infrastructure. Another important decision factor is the effects that 
the new infrastructure development will have on gas production and transportation in the 
adjacent areas.  
A relevant example of an infrastructure project in the Norwegian gas sector is the ongoing 
discussion of a transport solution in the Barents Sea. Exploration interests of petroleum 
companies have moved further north of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. According 
to estimates provided by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), about 43% of all 
undiscovered petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) are attributed to 
the Barents Sea (NPD, 2014). The only gas transport infrastructure currently available in the 
region is the LNG facility at Melkøya, which processes the gas from Snøhvit, the only gas field 
operating in that region. The operator of the field considers the expansion of the production 
and, accordingly, the expansion of the LNG facility. The main advantage of this solution is the 
market flexibility: a producer is not locked into the European market; therefore, the gas can be 
shipped by vessels to the highest-value markets, presenting the potential for higher profits from 
the Snøhvit field. 
However, there is also an alternative solution – a pipeline, connecting the Barents Sea with 
the existing transport network. This solution requires a higher initial investment and lacks 
destination flexibility, but implies considerably lower operating costs than the LNG. Another 
benefit of the pipeline solution is the utilization of the transport capacity in the existing pipeline 
network, which may become underutilized in the near future. Maintenance costs for these 
transport facilities will be shared between larger volumes of transported gas, reducing the total 
unit costs. The most important advantage of the pipeline solution is significant economies of 
scale in investments, which enables over-dimensioning.1 With regard to future discoveries and 
corresponding tie-ins, the additional costs to establish a capacity above the committed 
volumes are low. Spare pipeline capacity in the transport system provides incentives for 
exploration in the region and reduces the cost threshold of developing gas deposits along the 
pipeline. 
Two perspectives of evaluating upstream gas transport infrastructure projects can be 
distinguished. The first perspective represents the interests of a commercial petroleum 
company, which is willing to establish a transport solution for certain fields and considers the 
1 For example, scaling rule used by the transport system operator is cost1/cost2 = 
(capacity1/capacity2)^(2/3). Used downwards to 50% of original capacity and upwards to 200% of 
original capacity (Gassco, 2014). 
 _____________________________________ Value of flexibility in gas pipeline investments 
41 
infrastructure investments only one part of the field development. This perspective emphasises 
cost minimisation over the operation period of the fields in question. The second perspective 
evaluates the solution from the point of view of a public decision-maker, which aims to 
maximise value creation on the NCS in the long run and evaluates transport infrastructure 
projects beyond the lifetime of the fields that triggered the infrastructure development. In the 
Barents Sea infrastructure project, the first perspective emphasises market flexibility of LNG 
solutions and the related benefits, while the second perspective emphasises the benefits 
created by the economies of scale in investments of pipeline solutions and the opportunities 
provided by these.  
According to a study conducted by the operator of the gas infrastructure network on the NCS 
(Gassco, 2014), existing fields and discoveries are not sufficient to justify an investment in a 
new pipeline infrastructure from the Barents Sea. While the pre-tax net present value (NPV, at 
7% real discount rate) is similar for a new 32˝ pipeline and the LNG solution, the expansion of 
the LNG train is better when measured by the real internal rate of return (IRR) on investments. 
When the potential outcome of near-term (three years) exploration activities in the Barents Sea 
are taken into consideration, a 42˝ pipeline gives a higher NPV in four out of five exploration 
scenarios, and a marginally lower NPV in one scenario. An analysis of the long-term resource 
scenarios (40 years) also proves robustness of the pipeline solution with excess capacity. 
From the NCS perspective, the excess pipeline capacity has a certain value, because it creates 
the potential to connect new fields at a low cost if there are new discoveries in the future. From 
the project-economic perspective, investments in the excess pipeline capacity represent 
capital tied up in unprofitable long-term investments, because of the high required rate of return 
in the petroleum industry. Therefore, the costs of excess capacity need to be justified 
analytically. However, the evaluation approach currently used does not directly quantify the 
benefits of the flexibility provided by the excess pipeline capacity (see, e.g., Gassco, 2012, 
2014), although such a value might be an important part of the project evaluation from the 
perspective of the value creation in the gas sector in general.  
Using real options analysis, this paper aims to suggest an approach to attach a monetary value 
to the strategic flexibility provided by excess pipeline capacity in the project evaluation by the 
system operator. Real options analysis provides a means to estimate the monetary value of 
flexibility in investments, which is the ability to alter the course of the project so that expected 
returns are maximised or expected losses are minimised (Brandão et al., 2005). Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001) define a real option as the right, but not the obligation, to take an action, e.g. 
deferring, expanding, contracting or abandoning, at a predetermined cost, called the exercise 
price, for a predetermined period of time – the lifetime of the option. Examples of project 
flexibilities include deferring investment until new information arrives, expanding operations if 
market conditions are favourable, abandoning a project, suspending operations temporarily, 
and switching inputs or outputs. This paper focuses on the options to expand gas production, 
which are provided by pre-investments in excess pipeline capacity.  
The paper is organised as follows. A review of the relevant literature is presented in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the approach chosen for a real options valuation in gas transport 
infrastructure investments. The application of this approach to the valuation of the flexibility 
provided by excess pipeline capacity is demonstrated in Section 4. The implications of such 
valuations on the investment appraisal and decision system in the Norwegian gas transport 
sector is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
Petroleum investments are among the earliest applications of real options valuations. A license 
obtained by a petroleum firm for petroleum reserve exploration and operation can be 
considered an option to invest in the development of oil fields if market conditions are 
favourable. Examples of real options valuations of investments in petroleum reserves can be 
found in the classical books by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996), as well as in a 
number of research articles. For example, Smith and McCardle (1999) consider applying the 
real options approach to oil and gas investment valuations, and discuss the benefits of real 
options analysis over the traditional decision analysis techniques. Lund (2000) considers the 
value of flexibility in offshore oil field developments on the coast of Norway, using stochastic 
dynamic programming to model market risk and reservoir uncertainty. Miltersen (2000) allows 
for a stochastic interest rate and convenience yields in real options valuation of petroleum 
deposit investment. Chorn and Shokhor (2006) combine Bellman’s equation with a real options 
valuation algorithm to represent sequential investment decisions in petroleum field 
development. Johnson et al. (2006) examine the application of system dynamics to real options 
analysis in the oil and gas industry. Enders et al. (2010) apply stochastic dynamic programming 
to analyse the interaction between two types of real options arising in natural gas production: 
the option to scale the production level and the option to scale the extraction rate by pausing 
production.  
The body of real options literature dealing with natural gas production is well developed. 
However, the focus on investments in transport infrastructures is limited. A common approach 
to deal with upstream gas transport infrastructure investments, both in the research and 
practice, is to apply optimisation techniques, where existing infrastructures and potential 
projects are included in the model, and the optimal design is defined with the focus on the 
properties of the network (see, e.g., Rømo et al., 2009; Hellemo et al., 2012). When the optimal 
design of a transport infrastructure is defined, the investment analysis focuses on the activities 
on its ‘nodes’: gas production and consumption, and treating the costs of the transport 
infrastructure development as part of the total costs of a project. 
The downstream part of the gas value chain has started to attract the interest of real options 
research relatively recently. To name a few examples, Abadie and Chamorro (2009) present 
a valuation of investment options in a natural gas combined-cycle power plant and an LNG 
facility using the least squares Monte Carlo approach to model the fluctuation of gas prices. 
Following the same line of considering the power plant’s output rate according to fluctuations 
in the prices of power and natural gas, Arvesen et al. (2013) estimate the additional value 
created by using the pipeline linepack for short-term storage. The authors explore how given 
the capacity of a pipeline, the inlet and output pressure in the pipeline can be adjusted, so that 
it is possible to inject gas at one rate and withdraw at a different rate. Their paper valuates one 
of the flexibilities of the gas transportation system from the point of view of a large industrial 
gas consumer, which may also be relevant for gas producers. 
The main contribution of this study is the attempt to expand the scope of real options 
applications to the investment valuations of the upstream gas pipelines from the point of view 
of a public decision-maker. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Real Options Valuation Approaches 
Since the term ‘real options’ was introduced by Myers in 1977, real options analysis has 
attracted the attention of researchers and practitioners, and various approaches of real options 
valuations have been proposed (for a critical review, see, e.g., Borison, 2005). The so-called 
‘classic approach’ (see, e.g., Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999) is based on the theory of financial 
option pricing introduced by Black and Scholes (1973). This theory presumes that markets are 
complete, and all risks are liquidly traded on the financial market and can be hedged by 
constructing a portfolio of financial instruments that provides the exact same payoff as the 
project itself in any state and at any point in time. This assumption rarely holds for real-world 
projects, since there are many non-tradable, or private, risks, which cannot be hedged away. 
In response, researchers (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) have suggested using a finance-
based real options approach to valuate projects where market risks dominate, and to apply 
decision analysis techniques (as decision trees) to projects with primarily private risks. 
However, some approaches allow for valuating projects where both types of risks are present 
to a significant extent. Smith and Nau (1995) proposed an integrated approach where both 
market and private risks are identified explicitly. According to this approach, market risks can 
be modelled using traditional financial option pricing techniques (the replicating portfolio 
approach), while private risks are modelled through subjective beliefs and preferences of 
stakeholders expressed as utility functions. Another approach to deal with incomplete markets 
in real options valuations has been proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001). This 
approach does not explicitly rely on the existence of a traded replicating portfolio that can serve 
as a basis for valuation of the project market value. Instead, it is assumed that the present 
value of the project without options (evaluated using a traditional discounted cash flow 
technique) is the best unbiased estimator of the market value of the project (the market asset 
disclaimer [MAD] assumption). The market value of the project is then assumed to vary over 
time according to a random walk stochastic process (geometric Brownian motion [GBM]), and 
the options can be valued using traditional option pricing methods. The assumption that the 
project value follows the GBM is based on Samuelson’s (1965) proof that properly anticipated 
prices fluctuate randomly, meaning that multiple uncertainties affecting a project’s cash flow, 
which can follow different stochastic processes, can be reduced to a single uncertainty that 
follows a GBM.  
Numerous sources of uncertainty affect the volatility of project returns in the gas transport 
sector. The two main factors are the rate of exploration success and the dynamics of gas 
prices. Certainly, these are not the sole factors; there is also uncertainty over the investment 
costs, which may change significantly during the planning and construction period. The long-
term valuations may also be affected by the development of new technologies that influence 
investment and operating costs. The dynamics of gas prices and investment costs are market 
uncertainties, while the rate of exploration success and technological developments are 
project-specific, or private, uncertainties. The approach to real options valuations in gas 
transport projects needs to be able to incorporate both types of uncertainties. Therefore, the 
relevant methodologies are the integrated approach of Smith and Nau (1995) and the approach 
proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001), henceforth, the CA approach. The latter 
approach is adopted for the purpose of this paper, as it can be relatively easily applied in 
practice. 
There are two main ways of option pricing: a continuous model developed by Black and 
Scholes (1973) and a discrete approach of the binomial model by Cox et al. (1979). The CA 
approach relies on the binomial model, whereby the price of the underlying asset follows a 
multiplicative binomial process: the price can either move up by a fixed value 𝑢 or down by a 
fixed value 𝑑. If the value of the project follows the GBM, this value at any point in time has a 
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lognormal distribution. By equating the first and second moments of a binomial and lognormal 
distribution, we derive that 𝑢 = 𝑒𝜎√𝑡 (𝑡 is the length of the binomial period, 𝜎 is volatility), under 
the assumption that 𝑢 = 1 𝑑⁄ . This procedure ensures that the discrete distribution 
approximates the continuous distribution in the limit. Applying this technique, we get a 
recombining (event) tree representing the development of the asset value 𝑆𝑖𝑗  (𝑖 is the index for 
time, 𝑗 is the index for state at time 𝑖).  
In order to derive the value of the American call option, a decision tree is built. The tree is 
solved recursively. At the expiration date, the option value equals:  
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = max(𝑆𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸, 0)     (1) 
where 𝐸 is the exercise price of the option. Before the expiration date, the values on the nodes 
of the decision tree are defined using the risk-neutral probability approach (maximum between 
the value of the exercised option and the ‘alive’ option):  
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = max (𝑆𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸,
(𝑝𝐶𝑖+1,𝑗+(1−𝑝)𝐶𝑖+1,𝑗+1)
1+𝑟
)  (2) 
where 𝑟 is the risk-free rate and 𝑝 is the risk-neutral probability of the project value in the next 
period. Solving the tree backwards, we obtain the value of the project at time 0. 
The risk-neutral probability concept needs some explanation. The principle of risk-neutral 
valuation assumes that the expected future value of an option does not depend on the risk 
preferences of market players. This means that the expected return can be found by 
discounting at the risk-free rate. Hence, with continuously compounded growth, the expected 
value 𝐸(𝑉) at the end of a time interval 𝛥𝑡 satisfies the following equation: 
𝐸(𝑉) = 𝑉0𝑒
𝑟𝛥𝑡 = 𝑝𝑢𝑉0 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑑𝑉0 ⇒ 
𝑒𝑟𝛥𝑡 = 𝑝𝑢 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑑 ⇒ 
⇒  𝑝 =
𝑒𝑟𝛥𝑡−𝑑
𝑢−𝑑
       (3) 
 
3.2 Valuation of an Option to Expand 
An option to expand can be valued as follows. The underlying risky asset is the value of project 
𝑉, which follows a binomial stochastic process. The values of the up and down movements, 𝑢 
and 𝑑, are estimated based on the volatility of the project value. The expiration time is limited 
by the lifetime of the project. Additional investment needed to expand the project is the exercise 
price 𝐸. If the option to expand is exercised, the scale of the project is increased to a factor 𝑘. 
To find the values on the nodes of the decision tree, we start at the end node. If the increase 
of the project value due to expansion exceeds the cost of expansion (𝑘𝑉𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸 > 0), the option 
is exercised. At the expiration date 𝑡, the payoff is defined as:  
𝐶𝑡𝑗 = max(𝑉𝑡𝑗, (1 + 𝑘)𝑉𝑡𝑗 − 𝐸)             (4) 
Before the expiration, if the option is exercised, the payoff is (1 + 𝑘)𝑉𝑡𝑗 − 𝐸; if the option is kept 
‘alive’, the payoff is defined using the risk-neutral probability approach. The decision rule is: 
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𝐶𝑖𝑗 = max (
(𝑝𝐶𝑖+1,𝑗+(1−𝑝)𝐶𝑖+1,𝑗+1)
1+𝑟
, (1 + 𝑘)𝑉𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸)  (5) 
The value of the flexibility is the difference between the value of the project with the option to 
expand (𝐶0) and the value without the option (𝑉0). 
The described approach of the option to expand valuation can be adapted to upstream pipeline 
investments in the following way. The investment cost for excess pipeline capacity is the price 
that the investors pay to get the option to expand the system by tying-in new transport facilities 
and connecting new fields at a later point in time. The value of this option depends on the 
uncertainty over the project value. The project valuation includes all parts of the value chain, 
from the subsurface to the market, incorporating cost estimates from field developments, 
offshore and onshore processing facilities, and the transport of gas to the relevant market.  
To approximate the stochastic process followed by the project value, three parameters are 
needed: the estimate of the current value of the project; the volatility of returns; and the risk-
free rate. The risk-free rate over the life of the option is constant; the one determined by 
government bonds can be used. The initial project value 𝑉0 can be estimated as a traditional 
NPV, calculated based on the risk-free discount rate. The volatility of the project value 𝜎 is 
approximated by Monte Carlo simulation, which includes different price and resource 
scenarios. The upscaling potential 𝑘 is limited by the available excess capacity. The exercise 
price of the option is the additional investment required to upgrade the pipeline with new 
compressors, and for the development of new fields that come on-stream if market conditions 
are favourable. The option to expand may be exercised at any time in the future, but is limited 
by the lifetime of the pipeline in question. 
 
4 Example of Option Valuation 
In order to demonstrate how the described technique can be applied to evaluate the value of 
flexibility provided by excess capacity, a simulated example is considered. The example has 
the problematic setting of the Barents Sea gas infrastructure project. The numerical data is 
simulated to conform with the publicly available real values estimates (see, e.g., Gassco, 
2014). 
One gas transport solution assumes a pipeline of 32˝, which is suggested based on a medium 
resource scenario. The expected pre-tax NPV of the project is NOK 50 billion (€1 equals 
approximately 9 NOK) estimated by the traditional technique, using a risk-free rate of 2%. It is 
assumed that the option to expand can be exercised during the first 20 years of the pipeline 
operation. Assuming volatility equal to 10% a year (𝑢 = 𝑒𝜎√𝑡= 1.105, 𝑑 = 1 𝑢⁄ = 0.905), an 
event tree representing the dynamics of the project value over the 20-year period (21 different 
outcomes) is generated (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1 Event tree: value of the underlying asset 
For an additional NOK 5 billion, the initial pipeline dimension can be increased to 42˝. This 
gives the option to expand gas production by 50%, if the rate of exploration success is high 
and market conditions are favourable. This option can be exercised for an investment of NOK 
25 billion in the pipeline, the upgrade of processing facilities and the development of associated 
fields. The decision tree (Figure 4.2) is solved backwards to find the value of the project with 
flexibility. The calculated risk-neutral probability is 𝑝 =
𝑒𝑟𝛥𝑡−𝑑
𝑢−𝑑
=  0.575. 
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Figure 4.2 Decision tree for the option to expand 
The value of the flexibility provided by the excess pipeline capacity is the difference between 
the initially estimated project value and the value obtained after solving the decision tree. In 
the example, the value of the flexibility provided by a pre-investment of NOK 5 billion is NOK 
9.05 billion, meaning that the investments in excess pipeline capacity provide flexibility worth 
NOK 4.05 billion.   
The value of flexibility gets higher if volatility increases. In the example, with 𝜎 equal to 0.2, the 
value of flexibility is NOK 12.85 billion. The size of a potential expansion also positively affects 
the value of flexibility; if the project can be scaled up to 60%, it increases up to NOK 13.61 
billion. With a higher exercise price, expansion becomes less attractive and the value of 
flexibility decreases, i.e. an expansion cost of NOK 30 billion gives a value of flexibility equal 
to NOK 6.77 billion.  
5 Value of Flexibility in Project Appraisal 
Trigeorgis (1996) suggests a framework for investment appraisal where the project value, or 
the expanded (strategic) NPV, consists of an additive expansion of the traditional static NPV 
with various option premiums: 
Expanded (strategic) NPV = Standard (static) NPV + Option Premiums 
In this framework, the abovementioned trade-off between two viewpoints on the project (the 
investor and the public decision-maker) is reflected, among other aspects, in the focus on 
different option premiums. A project investor interested in finding a transportation solution for 
a set of well-defined fields does not have the incentive to account for flexibility provided by 
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excess pipeline capacity. However, the investor is interested in the value of destination 
flexibility, which in practice is accounted for by using a price premium for a unit of sold gas. 
According to some estimates (e.g., Gassco, 2014), it may be up to 10% of the market price of 
the pipeline gas. Rodríguez (2008) suggests an approach for real options valuation of the 
destination flexibility of LNG. The author compares a base case where the LNG flow is directed 
only to the EU market with a free destination case, in which the flow can be directed also to 
the North American market. Using the geometric Brownian motion process to model the 
stochastic gas prices, the author finds a 21% improvement in the value of the LNG flow in 
comparison to the expected value without destination flexibility. 
From the perspective of a public decision-maker, both the destination flexibility of LNG and the 
flexibility provided by excess pipeline capacity are of interest, because both contribute to the 
social surplus created in the sector. Therefore, both values should be included in the socio-
economic appraisal of upstream gas transport infrastructure projects, if an LNG and pipeline 
alternatives are considered. Shaton (2015) proposes an approach for a comprehensive socio-
economic appraisal of upstream gas infrastructure projects, which accounts for these two types 
of flexibilities. 
Literature showing the importance of using real options analysis in public decision-making is 
on the increase. Livermore (2013) discusses the application of the real options theory for public 
decision-making in the petroleum industry. He argues that the consideration of real options is 
necessary to maximise economic returns from non-renewable natural resource extraction, 
using the example of offshore oil drilling in the United States (US) as a case study. The author 
claims that the cost-benefit analysis of the economic consequences of leasing offshore lands 
performed by the responsible authority and the existing bidding system fail to account for real 
option value, thereby failing to maximise the net benefits generated by this public resource. He 
states: ‘Ultimately, planning and leasing decisions are being made without estimations of 
option value, and private market actors do not have incentives to adequately consider several 
of the central uncertainties that are relevant to society in general’ (Livermore, 2013, p. 637). 
Revesz (2014) also concludes that the quantification of real options can meaningfully affect 
the outcomes of agencies’ cost-benefit analyses and recommends adapting real options 
techniques used by US government agencies to evaluate the exploitation of natural resources. 
It should be noted that both authors consider only the values of delaying the decisions.  
The following simulated numerical example (Table 5.1) demonstrates how the real options 
valuation of excess pipeline capacity may be used in a socio-economic appraisal of an 
upstream infrastructure project, based on the structure proposed in Shaton (2015). This 
example extends the discussion of the Barents Sea Infrastructure Project mentioned in the 
previous section: there is an LNG solution of the exact capacity needed to transport gas from 
the existing discoveries, and a pipeline solution with two alternative capacities. There is no 
economies of scale in LNG investments; hence, there is no reason for pre-investments. A 32˝ 
pipeline corresponds to the existing volumes; a 42˝ pipeline requires pre-investments, but 
allows for a cost-efficient expansion of the system in the future.  
At the initial stage of the analysis, only the existing fields and discoveries are included, giving 
the expected revenue from selling the pipeline gas as NOK 70 billion, excluding the production 
costs. The expected revenue for the LNG alternative is 5% higher due to the destination 
flexibility. The LNG solution requires NOK 14 billion of initial investment (CAPEX), while the 
costs of the sea shipping accounts for an additional NOK 14 billion (OPEX) over the lifetime of 
the project, which corresponds to the expected lifetime of the fields in question. The 32˝ 
pipeline solution requires an initial investment of NOK 20 billion; the 42˝ requires NOK 5 billion 
more. There are regulated tariffs for pipeline transportation in Norway, which consist of a 
 _____________________________________ Value of flexibility in gas pipeline investments 
49 
capital element and an operating element.2 The operating element is calculated annually and 
covers the operating costs of running a facility. The capital element should cover the 
investment cost with a ‘reasonable’ return on the capital invested during the lifetime of a license 
(historically, 7% before tax). The capital element represents the revenue for the 
investors/owners of the infrastructure. The total tariff paid by the shippers for the transportation 
in the new 32˝ pipeline is NOK 27 billion (NOK 22 billion as the capital element and NOK 5 
billion as the operating element). The capital element of transportation via the 42˝ pipeline is 
higher due to the pre-investments. Therefore, the total tariff paid for transportation via this 
pipeline is NOK 32 billion. Due to the difference between the rate of return on the investment 
(7%) and the social discount rate (4%), the net income for investors in the pipelines is positive, 
equal to NOK 2 billion. The shipper will also use the existing network downstream; thus, the 
total tariff paid is NOK 4 billion. Comparing the NPV (4% discount rate) of the alternatives from 
the project-economic perspective, the LNG solution is better: NOK 45.5 billion vs. NOK 41 
billion for the 32˝ pipeline and NOK 36 billion for the 42˝ pipeline.  
Expanding the evaluation framework, the planner includes the effects on the rest of the 
transportation network. The inflow of gas from the new pipeline into the existing downstream 
network brings additional income to its owners (the capital element of the tariff paid by 
shippers, NOK 3 billion) and reduces the operating element of the tariff for the shippers (a 
savings of NOK 1 billion). The prospects for future tie-ins are included in the analysis as an 
option value of flexibility provided by excess capacity (NOK 9 billion, approximated from the 
previous example). 
Though this aspect is not covered in this paper, it should be noted that infrastructure projects 
in the gas sector may have significant externalities, such as environmental impacts, impacts 
on fisheries and shipping, which should also be taken into consideration in a complete 
socioeconomic evaluation of a project.  





Pipeline 32“ Pipeline 42“ 
Shippers in the new infrastructure     
     Revenue (excl. production costs) 70000 70000 70000 
     Value of destination flexibility 3500 0 0 
     Tariff in the new infrastructure 0 - 27000 -32000 
     Tariff in the downstream network 0 - 4000 -4000 
     Cost of shipping - 14000 0 0 
Investors in the new infrastructure    
     Investment costs -14000 -20000 -25000 
     Tariff revenue (capital element) 0 22000 27000 
TOTAL FOR THE PROJECT 45500 41000 36000 
Shippers in the existing infrastructure 0 1000 1000 
Owners of the existing infrastructure 0 3000 3000 
     Option value of flexibility 0 0 9000 
TOTAL FOR THE SHELF 45500 45000 49000 
                                               
2 Regulations relating to stipulation of tariffs, etc. for specific facilities, 20 December 2002, No. 1724. 
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Including the effects on the shippers and owners of the existing infrastructure, the NPV of both 
pipeline solutions improve by NOK 4 billion, while the LNG’s NPV remains unchanged. 
However, for the existing resource base, the LNG solution is still marginally better. Taking into 
account the possibility of expanding the transportation system and connecting new fields (if 
they are discovered) in the future and if market conditions are favourable due to pre-
investments in excess capacity, the 42˝ pipeline becomes the favourable solution.  
This example shows that the evaluations of a project from the project-economic and the NCS 
perspectives may lead to opposite recommendations. The participation of the independent 
system operator in the infrastructure planning on the NCS ensures that the effects on the 
existing network are taken into account; however, the value of flexibility in the pipeline 
investments has not been directly quantified and included in the analyses thus far. The 
presented example shows that this value can be estimated numerically and used in project 
appraisals. 
 
6 Conclusion  
Real options theory is a means to structure and value flexible strategies to address uncertainty. 
Real options is a particularly appealing concept when capital intensive irreversible investments 
must be undertaken under great uncertainty. In the case of gas transport infrastructure 
projects, multi-billion investment decisions are made under the uncertainty of gas prices and 
highly inexact knowledge of the long-term resource base. Infrastructure developments on the 
NCS are financed by petroleum companies, which need transport solutions for their gas fields. 
In order to ensure that the effects of new infrastructure development on the existing 
transportation system and the overall value creation on the NCS are taken into account, the 
development of the transportation network is coordinated by an independent system operator. 
Among other aspects, the system operator considers each infrastructure facility from a long-
term perspective and evaluates possibilities for future tie-ins.  
Due to high economies of scale, investments in excess pipeline capacity present the possibility 
for cost-efficient connections in the future. When an LNG and a pipeline solution are 
considered, a trade-off arises between the destination flexibility of an LNG and strategic 
flexibility provided by excess pipeline capacity. The destination flexibility of an LNG can be 
easily included in the project evaluation as a price premium for the unit of sold gas. The task 
of estimating the monetary value of flexibility provided by excess capacity is not 
straightforward. This paper demonstrates how real options analysis can be applied to estimate 
the value of flexibility in gas pipeline investments, and how this value can be used by a public 
decision-maker in the project evaluations. 
The simulated example demonstrated the importance of real options valuations in upstream 
gas pipelines investments. The inclusion of the value of flexibility provided by excess pipeline 
capacity may change the outcome of investment appraisals. It should be noted that the 
framework by Trigeorgis (1996) mentioned above allows for the inclusion of various real 
options in extended NPV calculations. Among others, there might be an option to delay the 
decision, or an option to expand the system stepwise by new tie-ins of different sizes, which 
represents a compound option.  
Considering investments in excess pipeline capacity through the lens of real options analysis 
has some limitations, as it cannot incorporate such effects as increased value creation onshore 
due to the expansion of petroleum activities. However, the real option value can serve as a 
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The objective of this paper is to propose an analytical structure to investigate the interaction 
between the existing tariff regime and the investment behaviour in the Norwegian gas transport 
sector. A sequential game between the government, which determines the tariff regime, the 
transportation system operator, which suggests the capacity of the pipelines, and a gas 
company, which makes the final investment decision and chooses between a pipeline and a 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure is used to derive the conditions, under which the 
socially preferable outcomes are achievable. The proposed analytical structure emphasises 
the relative advantages of the LNG and pipeline solutions: the price premium due to the 
destination flexibility of the LNG and economies of scale in the pipeline investments, which 
enable over-dimensioning of the pipelines with regard to future tie-ins. The independent 
system operator’s special position in infrastructure development is discussed.  
 
 
Keywords: Natural gas; Infrastructure; Regulation; Investments; Incentive problem 
  




Petroleum activities represent the largest industrial sector in Norway. In 2015, it accounted for 
15% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 26% of total investments (Statistic Norway, 
2016). The share of investments in pipelines and terminals was 13.69% of the total, which is 
not the main contributor to the total investments in the sector. In comparison, development 
wells accounted for 40.4%. However, for the natural gas value chain, the transport 
infrastructure is a critical element. Investments in a new transport infrastructure represent a 
significant part of the total costs of a development project, while available transportation 
solutions drive exploration and subsequent developments of new gas fields. Timely 
development of a transport infrastructure on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) becomes 
even more important, as the share of natural gas in the total petroleum production is steadily 
growing. In 2015, the share of natural gas exceeded 50% of the total production of oil 
equivalents (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2016). 
However, infrastructure investments will not be undertaken if the regulatory regime does not 
ensure appropriate conditions to recover the invested capital. In 2013, the Norwegian 
government decided to reduce the capital element of the transportation tariff in the majority of 
the existing transport facilities by 90% for the volumes transported and handled from gas year 
2016. As announced by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the reasons for such a decision 
were that the tariff reduction would increase incentives for exploration in mature areas and the 
development of new infrastructure from the new exploration areas, reduce the threshold for 
the development of marginal resources, and increase extraction in the tail-end phase (Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). This decision raised a surge of discontent among the owners 
of the infrastructure, because of a dramatic decrease in the expected return on the 
infrastructure investments. Important questions are whether the existing system provides 
sufficient perspectives for investment cost recovery for the new infrastructure projects, and the 
implications that the 2013 decision may have on the gas transport sector in the long run. 
Since the process of the liberalisation of the European Union (EU) gas markets started (the 
first EU Gas Directive was adopted in 1998), the problem of designing an optimal tariff structure 
and capacity allocation procedures for gas transportation has received considerable attention 
from both from policymakers and researchers. Among the earliest examples of theoretical 
contributions to the problem of optimal transportation tariffs in the liberalised gas markets is 
the paper by Cremer and Laffont (2002). In their paper, optimal gas transportation pricing and 
the transmission network dimension are derived for cases of perfect and imperfect competition. 
The network dimension, specifically excess pipeline capacity, is considered a suitable 
regulatory response to the market power of the local gas companies. Pelletier and Wortmann 
(2009) discuss whether the current tariff policy and uncertainty about supply and demand 
provide sufficient incentives for transport capacity investments. Using a multi-stage linear 
program, the authors simulate the repartition of the gas flows in the EU market in order to 
evaluate the risks of negative present value for the infrastructure investments. Gasmi and 
Oviedo (2010) derive optimal transport charges set by a regulator to maximise social welfare, 
given different forms of competition in the output between an incumbent and the marketer in a 
downstream gas commodity market. Lochner (2011) suggests a modelling approach to identify 
the transport infrastructure bottlenecks in the EU gas market and quantify their economic costs 
in order to ensure optimal investments in transport capacity. Another aspect of regulation in 
the EU gas transport sector, namely the balancing rules, is investigated by Keyaerts et al. 
(2011). This paper discusses the trade-offs between two ways of using gas pipelines, transport 
and short-term line-pack storage, which gives shippers and system operators flexibility with 
balancing supply and demand. The authors identify distorting effects to the gas market due to 
inadequate regulation of line-pack flexibility, because the existing balancing rules disregard 
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the sunk cost of using pipelines for storage. Chaton et al. (2012) analyse how the gas release 
programmes – a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer – 
advocated by the European Commission and transport infrastructure investments affect 
competition in gas markets. Their empirical analysis shows that combined with network 
expansion, gas release programmes under regulatory control are effective policies for 
promoting competition in the gas market.  
The United States (US) natural gas sector was considered competitive long before the EU 
started the liberalisation process; however, the problem of designing optimal regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure sufficient incentives for investing in transport infrastructures is also 
relevant. For example, McAfee and Reny (2007) analyse how the application of market-based 
transportation rates for interstate pipelines effect the efficiency of gas transportation services. 
In particular, the authors discuss how to determine the minimum excess capacity on rival 
pipelines that can prevent a company from exercising market power if market-based 
transportation rates are approved. Von Hirschhausen (2008) provides an extensive literature 
review on the historical and current discussion about the relationship between infrastructure 
investment and regulation/competition, and applies the findings to a case study of the link 
between restructuring and infrastructure investments in the US natural gas sector. The author 
finds that there is little cause for concern about infrastructure investments, resource adequacy, 
or supply security in the US gas market, although some improvements in the regulatory 
framework may enhance investments.  
The gas markets in the EU and the US have their own specific features; therefore, the 
theoretical developments for these markets have limited application to the problems arising in 
the Norwegian gas market, which is export-oriented with almost negligible domestic 
consumption of natural gas. As von Hirschhausen (2008, p. 9) emphasises, for the investment 
implications of regulation, ‘clear one-size-fits-all answers are not possible’, and ‘case-specific 
assessments are still needed to derive concrete, applicable policy conclusions’.  
The literature on tariff regulations in the Norwegian gas transport sector is rather limited. Hagen 
et al. (2007) discussed optimal tariffs in the case where the transport facilities are owned by a 
national gas producer with a public ownership share. The main assumption in this analysis is 
that the national appropriation of the resource rent through taxation is incomplete, and the 
question is to what extent it would be optimal to harvest some of the rents through the 
transportation tariffs. The derived optimal scheme is based on a modified Ramsey rule, and 
differentiates domestic and international shippers. Sannarnes (2007b) derives an optimal tariff 
in a network owned by a syndicate of gas producers. The optimal tariff structure required 
differentiated tariffs for the network owners and the third party. Sannarnes (2007a) discusses 
how a government can design socially optimal investment mechanisms to increase capacity in 
a gas transport network owned by a syndicate of gas producers. The identified preferable 
investment mechanism to allocate capacity is based on Vickrey’s second-price auction 
combined with regulated tariffs equal to marginal costs. Xu (2010) discusses how the 
restructuring of Norway’s gas sector in 2002 affected the development of the transport 
infrastructure. It was found that in the restructured sector, petroleum companies may limit the 
capacity of the new pipelines and challenge future network expansion.  
Recent changes in the ownership structure in the sector and the growing importance of the 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade raise the need for further study on the regulation and 
investment incentives in the Norwegian gas transport sector. The objective of this paper is to 
build an analytical structure to understand and explain the system of investment incentives in 
the Norwegian gas transport sector under the existing tariff regime. A simple model is 
developed in order to analyse how the tariff structure incentivises investments in the pipeline 
and LNG infrastructure on the NCS. Special emphasis is given to analysing the role of the 
independent system operator within the existing incentive structure. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the research problem on the basis of 
the ongoing discussion of an infrastructure development project on the NCS. In Section 3, the 
game of infrastructure developments is presented. Model implications are discussed in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Problem description 
The southern part of the NCS is a mature petroleum province with an extensive transportation 
network. The regulatory objective for this part of the shelf is to ensure high utilisation of the 
existing infrastructure, which may become an acute issue in light of an expected drop of gas 
inflow in certain pipelines in the coming years. In order to achieve this objective, a low tariff for 
access to the transport infrastructure is required. A low cost threshold due to a low 
transportation tariff may also incentivise development of the marginal fields in the mature 
areas.  
The northern part of the shelf is much less developed, but exploration interests of petroleum 
companies have moved further to the north of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. This 
establishes a need for further development of the transportation network. At the moment, the 
only transport solution available in the northern part of the NCS is the LNG facility at Melkøya 
that receives, processes and liquefies gas from the Snøhvit field in the Barents Sea, which is 
then transported to markets by sea-going vessels. The operator of the field considers the 
expansion of the production and, accordingly, the expansion of the LNG facility. The main 
advantage of this solution is market flexibility – the producer is not locked into the European 
market and the gas can be shipped to the highest value market. In addition, the investment 
costs for an LNG chain are relatively low, although the operating costs will be high compared 
to pipeline transportation.  
A wide debate about a new transport infrastructure project in the Barents Sea (BSGI) began 
in 2012, when Gassco, the independent gas transport system operator, initiated a discussion 
about the possibility of a major pipeline infrastructure in the area that would connect the 
Barents Sea with the existing pipeline network. A pipeline solution requires higher initial 
investments, lacks destination flexibility, but implies operating costs that are considerably lower 
than the LNG operating costs. An important advantage of the pipeline solution is a significant 
economies of scale in investments. This means that a major pipeline solution can be 
established in order to connect several discoveries in the area, thereby sharing the investment 
costs between several gas producers. Also, the additional costs to establish excess capacity 
above the committed volumes, with regard to future discoveries, are low. Available spare 
pipeline capacity in the transport system provides incentives for exploration in the region and 
reduces the cost threshold for development of deposits along the pipeline. However, according 
to the study conducted by the system operator (Gassco, 2014), the existing resource base is 
not sufficient to justify the investments in a pipeline infrastructure. However, if the potential 
outcome of near-term (three years) exploration activities in the Barents Sea are taken into 
consideration, the pipeline becomes the preferable solution. 
According to the existing regulatory framework, a transport facility, which is not field-dedicated 
and where third-party access is assumed, should be operated by a neutral and independent 
system operator. In practice, new major pipelines, e.g. Polarled pipeline, which comes on 
stream in 2017, become part of the Gassled joint venture, which is the formal owner of most 
of the pipeline infrastructure on the NCS, and fall under the operatorship of the independent 
system operator, the state-owned company, Gassco. The pipeline investors obtain 
participation interest in Gassled according to the value of their investments, and receive 
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payback through the capital element of the transportation tariff paid by the shippers. The tariffs 
are stipulated by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy according to the tariff regulation1 and 
consist of a capital and an operating element. The capital element is stipulated such that the 
owner of a facility can expect a reasonable return on the capital invested. Historically, the rate 
of return was 7% before tax. The operating element is stipulated based on full cost recovery. 
In light of a high internal rate of return in the petroleum industry, infrastructure investments are 
not generally regarded by gas companies as profitable investments, but rather as a cost of a 
deposit development. However, the companies had non-monetary incentives to participate in 
infrastructure projects. Before 2010, petroleum companies had preferential rights to book 
pipeline capacity up to 200% of their participation interest in the pipeline in question. When the 
preferential rights were abolished, the gas companies preferred to re-direct the capital tied-up 
in the infrastructure investments to their core activities. Several large gas producers sold all 
their shares in Gassled to financial companies, such as pension funds and other investment 
vehicles. The availability of such a market for the investments allows for considering the 
transport infrastructure separately from field development, as an independent investment 
project with a relatively stable return provided by the tariff revenue. Therefore, a gas producer 
considering development of a transport infrastructure sees it as both a shipper and as an 
investor. Because of this dualistic nature, a trade-off arises with regard to the tariff. As an 
investor, the gas producer would prefer a tariff with a high capital element; as a shipper, the 
company would prefer a low tariff.   
When evaluating a new infrastructure project, a public regulator considers the effects of the 
new infrastructure facilities on the rest of the transport network and the value creation on the 
NCS in general. It should be noted that the availability of a transport infrastructure alone does 
not incentivise exploration and development of new deposits along the pipeline. Rather, the 
availability of spare transport capacity makes exploration and development more probable. 
Therefore, with regard to potential further development of petroleum activities, it is important 
to establish excess pipeline capacity in the new infrastructure. However, gas companies, 
participating in an infrastructure project to ensure a means to evacuate the gas from their fields 
(a shipper perspective) are not willing to invest in excess pipeline capacity. However, a 
sufficiently high capital element of the tariff may incentivise a gas company to act as an investor 
and participate in such investments.  
In the incentive problem described above, the independent system operator plays an important 
role. According to the framework conditions, Gassco acts in a neutral manner, ensuring an 
efficiently run transport system for the benefit of owners and users. Among the tasks assigned 
to the system operator by the Petroleum Act2 (Section 4-9) is development of the transport 
system. Gassco operates on a no profit no loss basis and does not invest in infrastructure 
projects. Regarding the development of the transport system, Gassco has the role of a 
coordinator or ‘architect’ of the expansion of the network. Gassco’s task is to assess the need 
for new transport solutions, and recommend optimal capacity, routing and connections to 
existing facilities onshore and offshore. Development of the new infrastructure is referred to as 
Gassco’s responsibilities on behalf of the government; at the same time, the infrastructure is 
funded by gas companies and, if third-party access is assumed, becomes a part of Gassled. 
On the one hand, Gassco should follow the government’s objective, which is to provide 
sufficient transport capacity in order to ensure a well-functioning gas market in the long-run. 
Additionally, Gassco should also consider the interests of the infrastructure owners. Within the 
framework of the principal-agent theory, this situation can be considered common agency (see, 
e.g., Dixit et al., 1997; Peters, 2001). According to Bernheim and Whinston (1986), common 
                                               
1 Regulations relating to stipulation of tariffs, etc. for specific facilities, 20 December 2002, No. 1724. 
2 Act relating to petroleum activities (the Petroleum Act), 29 November 1996, No. 72. 
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agency is when the actions chosen by the agent affect several other parties (the principals) 
whose preferences for the possible actions of the agent typically conflict. In the case of gas 
infrastructure development on the NCS, Gassco is an agent whose choices affect two 
principals – the government and the infrastructure owners – with different preferences 
regarding infrastructure development. In the relevant literature (see, e.g., Hagen et al., 2007; 
Xu, 2010), the system operator’s decisions regarding infrastructure development on the NCS 
are typically not distinguished from the government’s decisions. In this paper, the system 
operator’s objectives and choices are considered separate from those of the government. 
 
3 The game of infrastructure development on the NCS 
3.1 Players and their strategies  
The problem described above determines the setting of the game presented in this section. 
The set of players consists of: a government that sets up the tariff regime; a gas company that 
decides whether to invest in a pipeline infrastructure or in an LNG facility; and a system 
operator that suggests the capacity of the pipeline solution.  
3.1.1 The government 
In order to ensure the efficiency of the gas transport market, the government simultaneously 
pursues two goals: (1) to ensure high utilisation of the existing transport network; and (2) to 
motivate further infrastructure development. The existing regulation prohibits tariff 
discrimination (neutral access requirement by the European Economic Area [EEA] Agreement) 
and reduces the government’s ability to directly adjust the tariff. The tariff is stipulated 
according to the formula established in the tariff regulation. However, the government can 
manipulate the construction of the capital element of the tariff. The capital element in the tariff 
formula may be changed through the change of the rate of return and/or change in the length 
of a payback period, which corresponds to the lifetime of the pipeline licence. Formally, these 
changes lead to the increase or decrease of the tariff. Therefore, the government’s strategies 
are to set up a tariff 𝑇𝐻 with a larger capital element, i.e. a shorter payback period and/or a 
higher rate of return, or to set up a tariff 𝑇𝐿 with a lower capital element, i.e. a longer payback 
period and/or a lower rate of return. A lower tariff means lower transportation costs for shippers, 
resulting in higher utilisation of the existing network. However, a lower rate of return on 
investments raises incentive problems for investing in a new pipeline infrastructure. A higher 
tariff works in the opposite way in that it incentivises infrastructure development but reduces 
utilisation of the existing network.   
The objective function of the government is naturally defined as social welfare maximisation 
through tax income and the state’s participating interest in petroleum activities (see, e.g., 
Hagen et al., 2007). For the purpose of this analysis, it can be simplified and expressed as 
maximisation of the total gas flow (Xu, 2010). Presumably, the larger the volume of transported 
gas, the higher the state income. This formulation of the objective function reflects both goals 
of the government: the gas flow is maximised both as a result of increased utilisation of the 
existing pipeline network and new infrastructure development. 
3.1.2 The system operator 
For the purpose of this model, the system operator’s decisions are restricted to determining 
the capacity of the planned transport facility, particularly the size of the excess capacity. As an 
agent of the government, it should pursue social welfare maximisation and place a preference 
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on planning sufficient excess capacity with respect to the expected growth rate of production. 
As an agent of infrastructure owners, the system operator should plan capacity corresponding 
to the volumes of gas in the existing discoveries. 
An independent system operator does not receive any profit from its activities. Thus, defining 
its objective function is not straightforward. This model assumes that the objective of the 
system operator is to minimise the total costs of gas transportation on the NCS.  
3.1.3 A company 
Usually, a group of companies holding licenses for the discoveries in the relevant area initiates 
a new transport facility development, applies for the corresponding pipeline license and invests 
in the project. One company is appointed as an operator and acts on behalf of the licensee. 
Therefore, the player ‘company’ represents the group of gas producers involved in the project. 
The company makes the final investment decision and defines the transportation solution: a 
pipeline or an LNG solution. The option not to invest is not considered, as a transport solution 
is an integrated part of gas field development, and a decision not to invest in a transport 
infrastructure would mean termination of field developments.  
The company’s objective function is profit maximisation. The choice between the pipeline and 
the LNG depends on the relative cost advantages of both solutions: the LNG requires less than 
the pipeline initial investments, but implies higher operating costs; in addition, the LNG solution 
implies a price premium due to destination flexibility.   
3.2 The game of infrastructure development 
In the game, the described decisions are represented by sequential moves. The government 
moves first and sets up the tariff regime. In practice, a company initiates the planning process 
of a particular transport facility. The choice of a solution concept is made in close collaboration 
between the licensee and the system operator. In the model, the decision of the system 
operator is placed before the company’s to indicate that the final investment decision is made 
by the company, which may prefer an LNG solution, if the pipeline solution recommended by 
the system operator is unacceptable from a commercial point of view.  
There is uncertainty over the resource base, which is modelled as two possible resource 
scenarios: low and high. It is assumed that the ‘nature’ moves before the government and 
determines the resource scenario. The probability of each resource scenario is common 
knowledge. The players can observe the actions of the other players. The parameters used in 
the model are listed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Parameters used in the model 
Notation Meaning 
𝑃 Production rate of the field(s) in question, the minimum capacity of the new pipeline 
𝑄 Throughput of the existing transport system 
𝐹 Fixed cost to develop a pipeline of capacity 𝑃 
𝛼 The increase of the production rate in the area of the field(s) in question in the case of 
the resource scenario Low, 0 ≥  𝛼 >  1 
𝛽 The increase of the production rate in the area of the field (s) in the case of the 
resource scenario High, 0 >  𝛽 ≥  1, 𝛽 ≫  𝛼 
𝛾 The increase of the production rate on the NCS due to a low tariff, 𝛾 >  1 
𝐹 Fixed costs to establish excess capacity of size 𝛼𝑃 or 𝛾𝑃; to establish excess capacity 
𝛽𝑃 costs 2𝐹  
𝑐 Operating cost of a pipeline of capacity 𝑃  
𝑅 Revenue of the company from the field(s) in question 
𝑅 Additional revenue of the company due to destination flexibility of LNG 
µ Cost ratio of LNG and pipeline solutions, µ > 1 
𝜂(𝑟, 𝑡) Fraction of fixed cost recovered, a function of the rate of return and a payback period 
𝑝
1
 Probability of the resource scenario Low 
It is also assumed that: (1) demand is always sufficient for all produced gas; (2) the fixed cost 
for the LNG solution is 𝐹/µ, variable costs are proportionally higher, µ𝑐; (3) if the established 
capacity is not sufficient, then a new pipeline is built at a cost 𝐹, and it suffices to transport 𝛼𝛾𝑃 
or 𝛽𝛾𝑃 of gas and does not assume overcapacity. 
According to its architect role, the system operator is not likely to plan capacity of a pipeline 
exactly equal to production rate 𝑃  of the field in question, but takes into account possible 
discoveries in the area and recommends solutions with excess capacity, either (1 +  𝛼)𝑃, 
corresponding to the resource scenario Low (lower bound for 𝛼 is set equal to 0, allowing for 
the possibility of zero expectation over future discoveries in the area), or (1 +  𝛽)𝑃, 
corresponding to the resource scenario High. The system operator observes the action of the 
government and adjusts its plans in accordance to the established tariff regime. The low tariff 
𝑇𝐿 means lower total costs, resulting in a general increase of gas production on the NCS to 𝛾. 
Therefore, in the case of 𝑇𝐿, the system operator plans either 𝛾(1 +  𝛼)𝑃 or 𝛾(1 +  𝛽)𝑃.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the game tree. The ‘nature’ move is omitted in the figure; the uncertainty is 
taken into account while constructing the payoffs. 
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Figure 3.1 The game tree. The payoffs are listed in the following order: Government, System 
operator, Company. 
The next subsection explains the reasoning behind the payoffs of the players. 
 
3.3 Payoffs and outcomes 
3.3.1 The government 
The gas flow in the transport system is the sum of the throughput in the existing network 
(representing the first ‘sub-goal’ – utilisation of existing network), the gas flow in the newly built 
pipeline (the second ‘sub-goal’ – network development) or the volume transported as LNG, 
weighted upon the probabilities of the resource scenarios. Under the high tariff, if the capacity 
of the established pipeline is not sufficient, then another pipeline is to be built at a cost 𝐹. If the 
low resource scenario occurs and excess capacity 𝛽 was established, then, there is 
underutilised capacity in the network. If the company decides to build an LNG without excess 
capacity and the opportunity for third-party access, the infrastructure needed by the other 
companies (LNG or pipelines) is to be built by other companies. All the gas that is needed to 
be transported will be transported; therefore, the payoff for the government is the same for 
nodes 5–8. For the low tariff case, the payoffs are constructed in the same manner, with the 
difference in the market response to tariff reduction 𝛾: volumes of gas transported as LNG are 
not affected by tariff reduction (nodes 2 and 4).  
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3.3.2 The system operator 
The payoff of the operator is the sum of the investment and operating costs, weighted upon 
the probabilities of resource scenarios. If the government sets up tariff 𝑇𝐿, the company decides 
to build a pipeline and the resource scenario Low occurs – the investment cost is 𝐹 +  2∆𝐹, 
variable cost is 𝛾(1 +  𝛼)𝑐. If the scenario High occurs, the established capacity is not sufficient 
and a new pipeline is needed, resulting in a fixed cost equal to 2𝐹 +  2∆𝐹. The variable cost 
in this case is 𝛾(1 +  𝛽)𝑐. If the system operator recommends larger capacity 𝛾(1 + 𝛽)𝑃, the 
investment cost is 𝐹 +  3∆𝐹 for both scenarios, and variable costs are 𝛾(1 +  𝛼)𝑐 and 𝛾(1 +
 𝛽)𝑐 for Low and High scenarios respectively. If the company decides to opt for the LNG 
solution, then a pipeline of capacity 𝑃 with investment cost 𝐹 is built by other companies to 
transport the volume 𝛼𝛾𝑃 or 𝛽𝛾𝑃 of gas from their discoveries in the area with corresponding 
variable costs. For the lower branch of the tree, the payoffs are constructed in the same 
manner.  
3.3.3 The company 
The payoffs for the company are defined as the difference between the revenue 𝑅 and total 
costs, assuming the option premium for destination flexibility of an LNG solution 𝛥𝑅. In the 
lower branch of the game tree, the company pays total investment costs to build a pipeline of 
either capacity (1 +  𝛼)𝑃 or (1 +  𝛽)𝑃, but uses only 𝑃, having variable cost 𝑐 in both cases. 
In the upper branch, the company pays the full cost to establish a pipeline capacity 𝛾(1 +
 𝛼)𝑃 or 𝛾(1 +  𝛽)𝑃, but uses only 𝛾𝑃 with the associated variable cost 𝛾𝑐 and receives an 
increased revenue 𝛾𝑅.  
The lower branch of the game depicts the tariff regime with a higher rate of return. These 
conditions allow the company to consider investment costs as partially recoverable. A part of 
fixed costs 𝜂(𝑟, 𝑡)𝐹 is subtracted from total costs in the outcomes 5 and 7. The rationale behind 
this is the availability of the second-hand market for the infrastructure investments. The 
increased rate of return expands this second-hand market, providing an opportunity for the 
company to recover pipeline costs more easily. Certainly, this second-hand market exists 
under both tariff regimes, but for simplicity, 𝜂(𝑟, 𝑡)𝐹 is introduced only under the high tariff, 
underlining considerably higher willingness to pay for the participation interest in the 
infrastructure assets by investment vehicles. The outcomes for the nodes 2, 4, 6 and 8 are the 
same, meaning that a lower tariff for the pipeline transportation does not affect the company’s 
revenue if it chooses the LNG solution. 
3.4 Results and findings 
The dominant strategy of the government is to follow the path of the low tariff because of the 
expected increase of the throughput of the system. Under this tariff regime, the company 
evaluates infrastructure development only from the position of a shipper, considering the 
pipeline alternative as a large fixed cost of a field development. This is because as an investor, 
the company observes a low rate of return on investments and little opportunity to recover 
costs in the short run. In this situation, the question of excess capacity becomes problematic, 
because the company has no incentives to invest in capacities higher than needed for the 
existing discoveries, 𝛾𝑃. Under the low tariff, investment in excess capacity means only tied-
up capital. The company’s choice between nodes 1 (pipeline) and 2 (LNG) depends on the 
value of flexibility of LNG, 𝛥𝑅: 
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∆𝑅 < (𝛾 − 1)𝑅 − ((1 −
1
𝜇
) 𝐹 + 2∆𝐹) − (𝛾 − 𝜇)𝑐 )   (1) 
If condition (1) is satisfied, gains from increased revenue due to low pipeline transportation 
costs and savings on variable costs minus losses on investment costs exceeds the premium 
for the destination flexibility of LNG. In this situation, the company chooses the pipeline solution 
and the game ends up at node 1. If the system operator suggests excess capacity 𝛽, the 
estimate for the value of LNG flexibility should be very low for the company to decide in favour 
of the pipeline, actually excluding node 3 from the set of realistic outcomes. Referring to the 
Barents Sea infrastructure project, a rather high estimate of 𝛥𝑅 can be observed (up to 10% 
of the sales price of the pipeline gas, according to Gassco, 2014), determining the strong 
tendency for the game to end up with an LNG solution, which is less preferred from the socio-
economic standpoint (lost 𝛾𝑃 in the payoffs for the government).  
A solution to the incentive problem is found in the lower branch of the game tree. If the 
government decides to follow the path of higher tariffs, it bears the loss of reduced utilisation 
of the existing capacity (lost 𝛾), and motivates the company to act not only as a shipper, but 
also as an investor. The shorter is the determined payback period and the higher the rate of 
return, the larger is the fraction of the investment costs, 𝜂(𝑟, 𝑡), which are considered 
recoverable.  
In the case of the high tariff, the company takes into account the second-hand market for 
pipeline investments and makes the decision both from the point of view of a shipper and of 
an investor. If the system operator recommends excess capacity 𝛼, the company has an 
incentive to invest in the pipeline solution if the following holds: 












If condition (2) is satisfied, the incentive problem is solved, the company invests in the pipeline 
of the capacity (1 +  𝛼)𝑃, and the game ends up at node 5.  
If the system operator suggests the pipeline capacity (1 +  𝛾)𝑃, the company chooses the 
pipeline solution if the following condition holds: 













If condition (3) is satisfied, the game ends up at node 7. 
The objective of the system operator was defined as minimisation of total transportation costs. 
Following this objective, the choice of the dominant strategy is based on expectations of Low 
and High scenarios occurring. From the point of view of cost minimisation, the LNG solution 
can also be preferred under certain relationships between variable and fixed costs. The 
common agency position of the system operator and assigned tasks makes its decision 
process more complex. The system approach for infrastructure development assumes 
planning for possible future connections, thereby providing incentives for exploration in regions 
with available transport solutions. In this regard, an LNG solution is not efficient because of 
low economies of scale and high operation costs.  
Under the low tariff, the game has a tendency to end at node 2 or 4 with an LNG solution. 
However, condition (1) can still be satisfied if economies of scale of the pipeline overcome the 
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flexibility advantages of the LNG. The choice of pipeline capacity can be obvious if the 
probability of the resource scenario High is low: the system operator recommends the solution 
with excess capacity 𝛼, which is acceptable for the company. If expectations of exploration 
success are high, then the common agency position of the system operator becomes explicit. 
In this situation, the solution with excess capacity 𝛽 is cost efficient and goes in line with the 
objective of the government – gas flow maximisation in the long run due to increased incentives 
for exploration in the region. However, if the only feasible solution for the company is the one 
with excess capacity 𝛼, the system operator should adjust its strategy and comply with another 
principal – the company. This solution is second best both for the system operator and for the 
government, but it is the only way to incentivise development of a pipeline and ensure 
development of the system in the long run.  
If the government sets up a high tariff, the company receives incentives as an investor, and a 
pipeline solution becomes more attractive than the LNG. As a result, the incentive problem as 
such lessens, but the system operator has to balance between the principals if the company’s 
willingness to invest does not correspond to the expected need for excess capacity. If condition 
(2) is satisfied, the system operator’s choice of strategy (1 +  𝛼)𝑃 goes in line with the 
company’s interests, while the choice of (1 +  𝛽)𝑃 does not, and the system is again inclined 
to end up with an LNG solution. Only if the tariff regime makes 𝜂(𝑟, 𝑡) large enough to satisfy 
condition (3), then there is no conflict of interest between the principals, and the system 
operator can choose strategy (1 +  𝛽)𝑃 without balancing between the principals. From the 
social welfare perspective, the outcome of node 7 is most preferable, when the rate of return 
is high enough to provide incentives to invest in sufficient excess capacity. The main drawback 
of this solution is that the government loses on the existing system utilisation because of the 
high tariff for the shippers. 
There is a trade-off for the government to establish a transportation tariff low enough for 
shippers and high enough for investors. This twofold objective of the government reduces the 
efficiency of tariff regulation in relation to the incentive problem. A need arises for an additional 
coordination device in the infrastructure planning. The system operator, acting as a common 
agency, bears this responsibility. Observing the actions of the government, the system 
operator evaluates investment incentives and suggests solutions that are both feasible for the 
investor and beneficial for the state. The responsibility of a common agent is to ensure efficient 
interactions between the existing tariff regime and market-based incentives, and to reconcile 
any conflicting interests of the principals. 
 
4 Model implications and discussion 
The interpretation of the game for the state of the Norwegian gas transport market before the 
tariff reduction suggests that the government kept a rather high tariff, prioritising the 
infrastructure development goal. However, according to the model, a low tariff was the 
preferred strategy of the government, which was reflected in the tariff reduction in 2013. This 
decision was motivated by prioritising the utilisation of the existing infrastructure.  
However, the changes of July 2013 relate only to the existing infrastructure and do not cover 
the newly built infrastructure. The government can ensure a high rate of return on new projects 
by having a lower one for the existing infrastructure. Such a strategy may have different 
implications. On one hand, lower tariffs in the southern part of the network provide incentives 
for petroleum activities in the north, even if the transport tariff in the newly built facilities is high. 
For example, the new pipeline planned for start-up in 2017, Polarled, will connect the fields in 
the Norwegian Sea to the processing facilities onshore at Nyhamna and the Langeled export 
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transport system to Easington in the United Kingdom (UK, the Langeled pipelines). According 
to the new tariff regime, the tariff for Langeled will be close to short-term average costs, while 
the tariff for Polarled will be based on long-term average costs. However, the total 
transportation costs for gas produced up north will be lower than they could have been under 
the old tariff regime. On the other hand, such a solution may have a distortion effect on the 
utilisation of the newly built facilities: the route of the Polarled pipeline will partially go along 
the existing Åsgard Transport pipeline, which is fully utilised at the moment, but is expected to 
have spare capacity in the near future. If the tariff for transportation service via Polarled is 
considerably higher than via Åsgard, companies may prefer to postpone field development 
until there is spare capacity at the latter one, leaving Polarled underutilised. 
Another important aspect of the tariff cut is its long-term implications on investment behaviour 
in the sector. The focus variable in the presented model is the share of recoverable investment 
costs. The reasoning behind this parameter is the existence of a second-hand market for the 
pipeline investments. Figure 4.1 shows how the Gassled ownership structure has changed 
since 2010, when preferential rights were abolished and financial companies (infrastructure, 
private equity and pension funds) acquired a large share of Gassled.  
 
Figure 4.1 Gassled composition in 2011 and 2016 (Data source: Gassco)  
*Petoro serves as the licensee for the Norwegian state's direct financial interest (SDFI) in petroleum activities 
The interest on such acquisitions by the investment funds suggests that Gassled shares had 
been generally considered secure and stably profitable investments before the tariff cut, 
although the financial companies accepted some volume risk. Although the tariff cut relates 
only to the existing facilities, potential investors have already announced their unwillingness to 
acquire the investments in the Polarled project. The reason behind such a decision is the 
increased regulatory risk. An important question is whether the current system provides 
sufficient perspectives for investment cost recovery, even with the high rate of return on new 
projects. At the moment, the existence of a market for infrastructure investments is under 
question. If the secondary market will not be recovered, there will be no demand for 
infrastructure investments, or gas companies will have to sell them at a lower price in order to 
recover some of the capital. If this price is too low for a company, it may prefer to keep the 
investments; then, the share of gas producers in Gassled will increase in the long run.  
However, for the gas companies, investments in any excess capacity means tying-up the 
capital. The secondary market for infrastructure investments helped to resolve the problem of 
establishing excess capacity. For a financial company, the value of infrastructure investment 
consists of two elements: the value of income from initially committed volumes and the option 
value of excess capacity that may be used by third parties in the future. Therefore, investments 
in excess capacity could be reasonable for the financial companies. The recent tariff cut 
increased the regulatory risk, disturbing the secondary market. Even if the government sets up 
a reasonably high fixed part of the capital element of the tariff for new infrastructure projects, 
the increased regulatory risk would diminish the option value of excess capacity for the 
investor, making investments in excess capacity highly problematic. 
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The incentive problem may be resolved by greater participation of the state in the investment 
projects, for example through Petoro, by funding the excess capacity to incentivise companies 
to explore and develop the marginal fields along the pipeline. However, according to the 
existing framework, Petoro participates in infrastructure investments proportional to its shares 
in the corresponding gas fields. If the framework conditions for Petoro were changed, and 
Petoro covered the necessary part of the investment costs in order to develop socially optimal 
transport capacity, Petoro’s share in Gassled would increase, making the system inclined to 
become state-owned. Such a solution may completely change the existing structure of 
investment incentives, and a deep study of its implications to the gas sector in Norway would 
be required.    
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper uses a game theoretic approach to understand the interplay between the existing 
tariff regime and investment behaviour in the Norwegian gas transport sector. The discussion 
about infrastructure development in the Barents Sea is the motivation for the paper and serves 
as an empirical base for modelling the choices of the parties involved in the process. 
Specifically, the trade-off between the pipeline infrastructure and the LNG infrastructure is 
analysed. The pipeline investments are characterised by significant economies of scale, which 
enable over-dimensioning of the pipelines with regard to future tie-ins. Availability of spare 
transport capacity in the pipeline motivates exploration and field developments, and may 
increase value creation in the gas sector in the long run. This makes pipeline investments with 
excess capacity a desirable alternative from a socio-economic point of view. On the other hand, 
the low initial investments and the destination flexibility with the corresponding price premium 
make LNG investments a preferred alternative for a gas company. 
It was found that the final investment decision depends on the perspectives for investment 
costs recovery as provided by the tariff regime and on the decisions of the system operator, 
who plays a special role as the common agent in the infrastructure development problem. The 
government aims at welfare maximisation from all petroleum activities on the NCS. This 
objective has two dimensions: maximising the utilisation of the existing network and developing 
a new infrastructure. The tariff regime works in opposite directions for these two dimensions. 
This ambiguity reduces the ability of the tariff regime to provide sufficient investment incentives. 
The actions of the system operator can mitigate the conflict of interest between the long-term 
welfare maximising objectives of the government and the short-term profit maximisation of 
commercial companies. Observing the actions of the government and the incentives of the gas 
company as a common agent, the system operator suggests a solution that is feasible for both 
principals. Intervention of the system operator is necessary to coordinate the infrastructure 
planning process and ensure a well-functioning gas sector in the long run.   
The model contains a set of rather strong simplifications (regarding the actions and payoffs of 
the players, relationships between the costs of the pipeline and LNG facilities, etc.) and does 
not pretend to be an exhaustive explanation of the complicated interactions within the gas 
transport market, but nevertheless, outlines its main features and provides an analytical 
structure to address important regulatory issues. 
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Emissions to air from production and transportation of natural gas is an important aspect of the 
decision making regarding the new infrastructure development in the offshore gas sector. In 
this study, we estimate the emissions of CO2, NOx, nmVOC and CH4 from extraction, 
processing and transportation of a unit of dry gas from the continental shelf of Norway to 
consumer markets; and compare the resulting emission intensities of the pipeline value chains, 
where gas is transported in gaseous form, with the LNG (liquefied natural gas) chains, where 
gas is liquefied and shipped by LNG carriers. The analysis substantiates the environmental 
superiority of pipeline chains over LNG-based chains. However, the comparative analysis of 
ten pipeline chains highlights the variability of the environmental performance of different chain 
configurations. CO2 emissions vary from 2.4 kg/Sm3o.e. to 352.4 kg/Sm3o.e. Due to the 
technological specificity of LNG chains, these prove to be significantly more CH4- and nmVOC-
intensive than pipeline chains. With regard to NOx emissions, there is no clear advantage of 
the considered pipeline chains over LNG chains. The isolated analysis of the transportation 
segment of the value chains confirms the superiority of the pipeline transportation over the 
LNG. 
 
Keywords: Natural gas; Emissions to air; Pipeline transportation; LNG 
 




The share of natural gas in the energy mix of the EU-28 has steadily increased from 17.8% in 
1990 to 24.4% in 2010. In recent years, however, this share has declined slightly, down to 21.4 
% in 2014, due to low coal and carbon prices (Eurostat, 2016). Nevertheless, in EU Reference 
Scenario, the share of natural gas is relatively stable at the level of 24-26% in 2030-2050 
(European Commission, 2016). Natural gas can play an important role in Europe’s ‘green 
transition’ due to the fact that the combustion of a unit of natural gas generates about one-half 
of the CO2 emissions of the equivalent amount of coal (53.07 kg of CO2 per MBtu against 95.35 
kg of CO2 per MBtu (Energy Information Administration, 2016)). End-use combustion 
generates the majority (80–90%) of the CO2 emissions from the natural gas value chain and 
has received due attention in academic research and political discussion. In this paper, 
however, we focus on the environmental footprint of the rest of the value chain: extraction, 
processing and transportation, which is especially important for gas-producing countries and 
their gas infrastructure development decisions. Relative advantage in terms of emissions to air 
in the upstream part of the natural gas value chain might become very important in the 
competition between the gas producers, especially under increasing CO2 prices. 
Emission intensity estimates of the upstream parts of the gas value chain can be found in 
studies devoted to life-cycle assessments of different fuels used for power generation in 
different parts of the world. For example, Tamura et al. (2001) and Okamura et al. (2007) 
perform analyses of the life-cycle CO2 and CH4 emissions from LNG and city gas in Japan. 
Jaramillo et al. (2007) present life-cycle air emissions of coal, LNG, synthetic natural gas and 
domestic gas for electricity generation in the US. Air emission estimates from gas production 
and transportation can also be found in life-cycle studies of transportation fuels. For instance, 
Arteconi et al. (2010) present a life-cycle GHG analysis of LNG as a heavy vehicle fuel and 
compared it to diesel in the context of European markets. COWI Consortium (2015) presents 
a study on actual GHG data on diesel, petrol, kerosene and natural gas through a life-cycle 
‘well-to-tank’ approach.  
There is also growing literature on the environmental effects relating to liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) chains. For example, the Pembina Institute (2013) presents a study of greenhouse gas 
emissions of the domestic component of the LNG chain in British Columbia. Abrahams et al. 
(2015) analyse how incremental US liquefied natural gas exports affect global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Several studies have considered both LNG and pipeline gas. ARI and ICF (2008) 
compares the emission intensities of CO2, CH4 and N2O (from extraction to the burner tip) for 
the two main natural gas supply chains in the US: domestically produced gas and imported 
LNG. Starting from production up to consumption for power generation, Taglia and Rossi 
(2011) analyse the environmental and economic impacts of the gas entering Europe.  
However, to our knowledge, there are no in-depth studies comparing the environmental 
footprint of LNG and pipeline chains from the perspective of a gas producer. In this paper, we 
have developed and applied an approach for a detailed analysis of emissions from the 
upstream part of the gas value chain based on real world data from the existing chains 
delivering gas from the Norwegian continental shelf to consumer markets. 
Norwegian gas covers more than 20% of the EU’s total gas consumption (Eurostat, 2016). 
Most of the Norwegian gas is transported via an extensive pipeline system across the North 
Sea to receiving terminals in Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. A small 
fraction of the gas (about 5% of total export) is shipped in liquid form by ocean-going tankers 
from the Hammerfest LNG (liquefied natural gas) facility in northern Norway to Europe, Asia 
and North and South America (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2016). Norwegian 
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exploration activities move further north into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. This 
raises the question of a new transport infrastructure development for the purpose of evacuating 
gas from new fields to the markets. According to a recent study by the transport system 
operator, a pipeline chain and an LNG chain are both relevant solutions (Gassco, 2014). 
Besides having different socio-economic characteristics, these two alternatives may have 
considerably different environmental impacts. The choice between LNG-based chains and 
pipeline systems is also slated as a relevant consideration in other parts of the world (e.g. the 
UK, Canada and the USA). 
Gavenas et al. (2015) empirically investigate the influence of the age and size of fields, the 
share of oil in total reserves, and the carbon prices on the CO2 emission intensities of 
Norwegian oil and gas extraction. In this paper, we expand the scope of the analysis and, in 
addition to the extraction, we also consider the processing and transportation segments of the 
value chain. In order to compare the environmental footprint of the two main alternative gas 
chains, pipeline and LNG, we estimate the unit emissions to air of CO2 (carbon dioxide), NOx 
(nitrogen oxides), nmVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) and CH4 (methane) 
associated with the extraction, processing and transportation of natural gas from the 
production fields on the NCS to consuming markets in gaseous form via pipelines and in liquid 
form by sea-going LNG carriers. 
The paper is organised as follows. The methodology and the choice of cases are discussed in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis. Subsection 3.1 is devoted to carbon 
emissions. Subsection 3.2 presents the analysis of other emissions. Subsection 3.3 outlines 
the analysis of indirect emissions related to the construction and decommissioning of 
infrastructure facilities. The results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Methodology 
The natural gas value chain consists of five main parts for both LNG and pipeline gas: 
extraction, upstream transportation, processing, export transportation and distribution (Figure 
2.1). The gas extracted at an offshore field is first transported via a pipeline to a processing 
facility. After processing, it can either be transported further via a pipeline or be liquefied, 
shipped by sea in special LNG tankers and regasified before being transmitted to downstream 
distributors.  
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Figure 2.1 Natural gas value chain 
The general structure of a pipeline chain may have several configurations. In a typical pipeline 
chain on the NCS, the water, condensate and parts of the NGL (natural gas liquids) are 
separated from the wellstream at offshore platforms, which is called the primary separation. 
The remaining raw (rich) gas is transported via rich gas pipelines to onshore facilities for further 
processing. When the remaining NGL are removed at a processing plant, dry gas (methane 
and some ethane) is transported via dry gas pipelines to Europe. On a receiving terminal, 
possible liquid residues and solid particles are removed, gas passes through a final quality 
check and regulation of pressure and temperature before delivery to downstream distributors. 
In some cases, the upstream transportation (rich gas pipelines) can be longer than the export 
transportation (dry gas pipelines). Some fields situated close to the shore have no processing 
steps offshore. The unprocessed wellstream is sent directly via multiphase pipelines to a 
processing facility onshore. There are also fields that are not connected to any onshore 
processing facility. The wellstream is processed at a platform, and the resulting dry gas is sent 
directly to continental Europe via dry gas pipelines. The choice of a processing solution 
depends on many factors such as the location of the reservoir, sea depth, distance to shore 
and available transportation solutions.  
In order to perform a reasonable comparison, we consider ten pipeline chains (Figure 2.2, 
Table 2.1), which represent the described configurations. We consider fields of different size 
and age connected to each of the three major gas processing plants on the NCS: Kårstø in 
Rogaland, Kollsnes in Hordaland and Nyhamna in Møre og Romsdal County and two fields 
with offshore processing. A significant difference between environmental footprints also comes 
from the power generation options available to each facility. Therefore, we include in the 
analysis fields connected to the main electricity grid onshore and the fields using feed gas to 
generate electricity.  
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Figure 2.2 Gas pipelines on the NCS (Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). The 
circles highlight the fields chosen for the analysis 
There is only one large-scale LNG chain on the NCS, which produces gas from the Snøhvit 
field in the Barents Sea (not illustrated in Figure 2.2; it is situated 70° latitude.). As the 
estimates are sensitive to the distance over which the LNG is shipped, we consider three 
alternative destinations: the two existing shipping routes to the Iberdrola terminal in Spain, 
Bilbao, and the Cove Point terminal on the Western coast of the US as well as one hypothetical 
destination, the Zeebrugge terminal in Belgium, which represents a close comparison to a 
pipeline alternative. 
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A brief description of the chains and the corresponding net production of sale gas, oil, NGL 
and condensate is presented in Table 2.1. Most of the considered offshore platforms receive 
and process the wellstream from several satellite fields. The numbers presented include these 
volumes. It should also be noted that while Table 2.1 indicates the main flows of sales gas, via 
a system of hubs gas from one field can be directed to several alternative destinations in 
Europe. 
The total emission intensities of pipeline and LNG chains are estimated by adding up emission 
intensities on all segments of the defined parts of the chains. The emissions relating to 
extraction include those by mobile units used to drill production wells. Exploration (seismic 
surveys by special ships, exploration drilling by drilling rigs) and support activities provided by 
supply vessels and helicopters and emissions relating to the storage and loading of oil and 
NGL/condensate are excluded from the analysis.  
The analysis of the extraction-related emissions is based on the yearly reports of the operators 
of the platforms on the NCS to the Ministry of Climate and Environment (mainly 2014, and in 
some cases, 2013 and 2012). These environmental reports provide data on total annual 
emissions from flares, turbines, boilers, ovens, engines, cold vents and fugitive emissions from 
the offshore platforms. We calculated the emission intensities by combining the information on 
the reported emissions and the volumes of produced, processed or transported hydrocarbons 
– a top-down approach.  
Onshore facilities report only some emissions relating to certain processes. The missing data 
was obtained from other sources: plans for the development and operation of petroleum 
deposits; plans for the installation and operation of facilities and other publicly available 
technical documentation.  
 
  
                                            
 
Table 2.1 Description of the pipeline and LNG chains  
Field, year of prod. Start 
(Satellites) 
Upstream gas transport 
Processing 
facility 
Export gas transport, destination point 
Gas,         
Sm3 o.e./year 






Åsgard, 1999 (Mikkel, 
Morvin)  
Åsgard Transport (707 km, 42") 
Kårstø 
Europipe II (658 km, 42") to Dornum, Germany 
11 836 432 4 254 851 4 699 456 
Kristin, 2005 (Tyrihans) Åsgard Transport (707 km, 42") 2 525 856 4 402 247 979 629 
Norne, 1997, gas export 
from 2001 
Norne Gas Transport (128 km, 
16"), Åsgard Transport (707 km, 
42") 
2 074 794 2 535 672 486 694 
Statfjord, 1979 (Statfjord 
Nord, Statfjord Øst, Sygna, 
Snorre and Vigdis) 
Statpipe (308 km, 30") 
Statpipe (228 km, 28") – Draupner S – Statpipe 
(203 km, 36") – Norpipe (440 km, 36"), to 
Emden, Germany 
1 859  285 7 550 282 1 645 631 
Troll, 1995 (Fram, Fram-H 
Nord) 
Field-dedicated multiphase 
pipeline (63 km)  
Kollsnes 
Zeepipe IIA (303 km, 30") – Sleipner R – 
Zeepipe (814 km, 40"), to Zeebrugge, Belguim 
29 651 627 9 850 985 1 323 609 
Kvitebjørn, 2004 Kvitebjørn Pipeline (147 km, 30") 
Zeepipe IIB (304 km, 30") – Draupner E – 
Europipe  (620 km, 40"), to Dornum, Germany 
6 768 726 1 981 585 979 431 
Ormen Lange, 2007 
Field-dedicated multiphase 
pipeline (120 km) 
Nyhamna 
Langeled North (627 km, 42") – Sleipner R – 
Langeled South (543 km, 44"), to Easington, UK 
20 209 660 0 1 363 755 
Aasta Hansteen, 2017 Polarled (481 km, 36") 7 700 000 0 175 000 
Sleipner Øst, 1993 (Gudrun, 
Gungne, Sigyn, Volve) 
Offshore 
Zeepipe (814 km, 40"), to Zeebrugge, Belguim 
5 821 793 1 940 187 550 080 
Sleipner Vest, 1996 Offshore 4 766 108 0 2 221 946 
Snøhvit, 2007 
Field-dedicated multiphase 
pipeline (143 km) 
Hammerfest 
LNG 
- Cove Point,US (4072 nautical miles) 
- Iberdrola, Spain (2019 nautical miles) 
- Zeebrugge, Belgium (1375 nautical miles) 
4 651 352 0 1 200 359 
Source: own compilation based on annual reports of field operators to the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment 
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The total emissions of a facility needed to be allocated between the hydrocarbon products 
produced at that facility (gas, oil, condensate, NGL) on the basis of their contributions to the 
total emissions. For example, gas turbines, the main emitters of CO2 and NOx offshore, 
produce energy for all the operations on a platform, including the extraction, processing and 
compression of gas for pipeline transportation. Most of the existing literature (e.g. Tamura 
2001; Okamura, 2007) considers the NGL and condensate on par with dry gas, assuming that 
their emission intensity is the same. However, these studies do not consider fields that produce 
oil in addition to gas and condensate. Gavenas et al. (2015), estimating the CO2 emission 
intensity of oil and gas extraction on the NCS, assumed that all products had the same impacts. 
We allocate the emissions between the hydrocarbon flows based on the following 
considerations: emissions generated by gas flaring, boilers and engines are attributed to the 
production/processing of the wellstream and are therefore related equally to gas, oil, 
condensate and NGL. A part of the emissions generated by gas turbines relates to the energy 
needs of the compressors used to inject gas or seawater to maintain pressure in reservoirs 
and for the living quarters on manned platforms. This part of the emissions is also allocated 
equally between all four products. A second part of the energy produced is used to compress 
gas for pipeline transportation. There is very limited information on the relative share of the 
energy used for gas transportation in the total energy production on a platform. Only one report 
(for the Norne field) provides precise information: 65% of the energy generated is used for 
export compression. Some information can be extracted from industry analytics and appraisal 
reports. In Bakkane (1994), 59% of gas turbine emissions are attributed to production and 41% 
to transportation. In the impact assessment of the Linnorm field development (Shell, 2012), 
82% of all CO2 emissions from the field were attributed to export compression; however, this 
field does not contain a considerable amount of oil. When more detailed data is not available, 
we assume that 60% of the power generated by turbines is consumed by the compressors 
used to transport gas and that 40% is used for other field operations. 
The unit emissions of CO2 and NOx from an offshore platform relating to gas extraction, initial 
processing and compression, 𝑈𝐸𝐺𝑎𝑠, are calculated on the basis of the following logic: 
𝑈𝐸𝐺𝑎𝑠  =












where 𝑇𝐸𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑇𝐸𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑇𝐸𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑠, 𝑇𝐸𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 and 𝑇𝐸𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 are the total reported emissions 
of the considered type (CO2 or NOx) from flares, boilers, ovens, well tests and turbines, 




𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the volumes of the 
corresponding hydrocarbons produced at a field 𝑖 which is connected to the platform; 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤
1 is the part of the energy used for processes other than gas export compression. The volume 
of hydrocarbons is measured in Sm3o.e. (corresponds to 1000 Sm3 of gas, 1 Sm3 of oil, 1 Sm3 
of condensate and 1 Sm3 of NGL). In order to calculate unit emissions of CH4 and nmVOC, 
the first part of the formula also includes diffuse emissions and cold vents. 
The fact that the analysis is based on environmental reports for each platform gives this study 
the advantage of using field-specific emission factors and values measured at site instead of 
theoretical parameters. Theoretical emissions factors are used to estimate emissions relating 
to LNG sea shipping and regasification. 
Studies focusing on greenhouse gas emissions in the gas sector usually point to the CO2 
content in raw gas. If it is higher than what is specified in sales agreements (2.5 mol% for the 
pipeline gas entering the EU), the excess CO2 should be separated and is either vented to the 
air, which is usual, or in some cases sequestered in underground storage. The organisation of 
the pipeline network on the NCS allows blending gas from most of the fields in order to achieve 
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the required sales specification without having to separate and vent CO2. The exact data on 
the proportions in which the gas from different fields is blended is not accessible; therefore, we 
do not consider this aspect separately. There is a CO2 removal facility at the Kårstø plant, from 
where the separated CO2 is vented to the air. The relevant emissions are included in the 
emission intensity of the processing at this plant. 
We assume a zero emission factor for grid electricity. Electricity in Norway is almost entirely 
generated by renewables (in 2014, 95.9% was hydropower). According to the International 
Energy Agency (2011), CO2 emissions from the electricity sector in Norway are about 5 grams 
per kWh, which is negligible compared to the OECD average of 443 grams per kWh. 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Carbon emissions 
Figure 3.1 shows the CO2 emission intensities of the considered chains. The footprint of the 
pipeline chains varies from 2.4 kg/Sm3o.e. for the Ormen Lange chain to 352.4 kg/Sm3o.e. for 
the Statfjord chain. However, the Statfjord field is an outlier with 300.435 kg/Sm3o.e. of offshore 
emissions. It is one of the oldest fields on the NCS, on its late life production stage, with much 
lower energy efficiency compared to newer fields.1  
 
Figure 3.1 CO2 emission intensity (kg/Sm
3o.e.) 
                                               
1 The Statfjord infrastructure complex is undergoing significant reconstruction and will become more 
energy efficient in the near future. 
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The largest contributor to the CO2 footprint of the pipeline chains is the offshore segment, 
which is due to gas-based energy production. Turbines account for about 90% of the total 
emissions of the fields not connected to the main electricity grid onshore (e.g. 90.2% for Norne 
and 90.18% for Kristin in 2014). 
The footprint of the Snøhvit LNG chain varies from 286.2 kg/Sm3o.e. for the shortest route to 
385.0 kg/Sm3o.e. for the longest route. The main emissions contributors are power generation 
for liquefaction and fuel combustion for sea shipping.  
The lowest CO2 intensity is inherent to the chains connected to the main electricity grid 
onshore, Ormen Lange and Troll, where gas is not used for power generation in any segment 
of the value chain. The gas from the Ormen Lange field is extracted by a subsea installation, 
which receives power from the land and produces no emissions to air except exhaust gases 
during the drilling of the production wells (0.430 kg/Sm3o.e.). The unprocessed wellstream is 
transported to the Nyhamna plant, which uses grid electricity for all processes, including export 
compression. Processing-related emissions are mainly from flares and diesel engines (1.421 
kg/Sm3o.e.). The infrastructure complex Troll consists of three platforms: Troll A, B and C. The 
gas is produced at the Troll A platform while oil is mainly produced at Troll B and C. Troll A 
receives power from the main grid onshore and does not utilise gas turbines for power 
generation. The emissions from the platform are from flares and engines (4.357 kg/Sm3o.e.). 
The Kollsnes processing plant also uses grid electricity for export compression, adding only 
1.602 kg/Sm3o.e. to the total chain emissions. The export transportation segment for these two 
chains adds only 0.551 kg/Sm3o.e., which is emitted by gas turbines to produce energy at riser 
platforms for the monitoring of the pressure, volume and quality of the gas flows at the hubs.  
These two chains have a very low emission footprint because they are situated close to the 
shore, and it was technically possible and economically reasonable to connect them to the 
electricity grid onshore. Another gas field connected to the Kollsnes plant is Kvitebjørn, which 
uses gas power at the platform, produces 12.203 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. of gas. The total unit 
CO2 emissions for these chains are 2.2 times higher than that of the Troll chain. In 2017, the 
Aasta Hansteen field is expected to come on stream, connected to the Nyhamna plant. The 
development concept is a floating platform, which covers energy needs by a gas power plant 
on site. Rich gas will be transported to Nyhamna via the 480 km Polarled pipeline. The offshore 
segment of this chain will emit 32.266 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. of gas.2  
The pipeline chains connected to the Kårstø processing plant have the highest CO2 emission 
intensities. The explanation is twofold: these chains have high offshore emissions because of 
the long upstream transportation segment; there are also high emissions at the onshore 
segment. The processing-related emissions at this plant (24.542 kg/Sm3o.e.) are as high in 
comparison to the other two plants due to the CO2 removal from the raw gas, which is vented 
to air. The export compression is also mostly gas driven. The plant receives gas from two 
incoming rich gas pipelines, Statpipe, which brings gas from the Statfjord field, and Åsgard 
Transport, which brings gas from the Norne, Kristin and Åsgard fields. After processing, the 
Statpipe gas is exported via the Statpipe dry gas pipeline, and the Åsgard gas is exported via 
Europipe II. The export transportation via Europipe II is slightly less emission-intensive (17.916 
kg/Sm3o.e.) than via Statpipe (26.873 kg/Sm3o.e.) because one of the three compressors at 
the entry of this pipeline is driven by an electrical compressor while all three are gas-driven at 
                                               
2 The data for the expected emissions of CO2, NOx and nmVOC are taken from the plan for the 
development and operation of the field delivered to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 2012 (Statoil, 
2012). The CH4 emissions estimate is based on experience data from similar fields. 
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the Statpipe entry. The Statpipe transportation line also includes a hub, which generates an 
additional 0.551 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. of gas transported. 
The Kristin chain was included in the analysis to determine whether there is a scale effect of 
the volume of gas produced at a field in relation to the CO2 footprint. The emission intensity of 
the offshore operations at Kristin is 83.975 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e., which is 22.51% higher than 
that of the Åsgard field (68.532 kg/Sm3o.e.), which produces about four times more gas. The 
Norne chain is the longest pipeline chain operating on the NCS (1493 km from the field to the 
receiving terminal in Germany). The Norne field (of a size comparable to Kristin) is connected 
to Åsgard Transport via an additional 128 km pipeline. The emission intensity of the offshore 
segment of the Norne chain is 133.529 kg/Sm3o.e., which is 59.01% higher than that of Kristin.  
After the four chains, which use grid electricity, the next highest emission intensity comes from 
the two fields, Sleipner Øst and Sleipner Vest, which have no processing steps onshore.3 
However, this result should be seen in light of the distances over which the gas is transported: 
the distance is about twice shorter for the Sleipner gas than for the Åsgard gas. The emission 
intensity of Sleipner Øst4 (63.837 kg/Sm3o.e.) is lower than that of Sleipner Vest (76.138 
kg/Sm3o.e.) because of the difference in processing the wellstream. The Sleipner Vest gas has 
a high CO2 content, up to 9 mol%, while Sleipner Øst only has about 1 mol%. The development 
concept for Sleipner Vest included the first commercial offshore carbon treatment and storage 
project in the world. The separated excess CO2 is injected in a subsea reservoir for storage. 
The treatment and injection of the separated CO2 adds about 13 kg of CO2 to the emission 
intensity of the chain.  
According to Figure 3.1, the LNG chains are considerably more CO2 intensive than the 
considered pipeline chains, except for the Statfjord chain. However, the Melkøya LNG plant is 
considered the cleanest in the world (e.g. Glave and Moorhouse, 2013). There are two main 
reasons for this. The CO2 content of the gas from the Snøhvit area is rather high, about 5–8 
mol%, but the separated CO2 is transported through a pipeline back to the field and injected in 
the underground reservoirs. This offsets most of the emissions that would otherwise be vented 
to air (according to our estimates, that would mean an additional 150.494 kg of CO2 per 
Sm3o.e.). The cold climate of northern Norway also benefits the plant, making the process 
more thermally efficient.  
The unprocessed wellstream from the Snøhvit field is extracted by a subsea gathering system 
and transported via a 143 km pipeline to the onshore processing and liquefaction facility. The 
upstream transportation part of the LNG chain produces no emissions; the wellstream reaches 
the onshore facility due to reservoir pressure. All processing of the wellstream takes place at 
the Melkøya LNG plant. The emission intensity of the onshore segment of the chain is 206.243 
kg/Sm3o.e.5 The energy needs of the plant are covered by its own energy production from the 
use of five gas turbines. On the basis of the information provided in Neeraas and Maråk (2011), 
                                               
3 Several processes at the two fields are interconnected; therefore, not all emissions can be accurately 
separated. The resulting emission intensity is slightly overestimated for Sleipner Øst and underestimated 
for Sleipner Vest. 
4 The estimate is based on data from 2013 because in 2014, a new field (Gudrun) was connected to the 
infrastructure complex. Apart from somewhat increased CO2 and NOx emissions due to the installation 
and preparation of equipment on the Gudrun platform, the drilling of five new wells caused high nmVOC 
and CH4 emissions, which resulted in untypical unit emissions for the Sleipner Øst system. 
5 The only available complete emission data for the plant is for 2012. The production volume and general 
emission level in 2012 were not significantly different from 2014. 
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we estimate that about 90% of the generated power is used for liquefaction, meaning that the 
largest part (146.975 kg/Sm3o.e.) of the total emissions is due to liquefaction. The resulting 
LNG is transported by conventional LNG tankers with a cargo capacity of 145,000 m3 and a 
service speed of 19.5 knots. The tankers use the steam-turbine propulsion system whose main 
engines are 27,600 kW. The boil-off rate is assumed to be 0.15% of the daily cargo capacity 
and covers 50% of the fuel requirements; another 50% is HFO (heavy fuel oil). Using the 
emission factors for ship propulsion provided by Wayne (2006), the emission intensity of sea 
shipping is 148.251 kg/Sm3o.e. for the Cove Point destination, 72.672 kg/Sm3o.e. for Iberdrola 
and 49.417 kg/Sm3o.e. for Zeebrugge. For all three destination points, we assume that 1.5% 
of the gas received is used as fuel for the submerged combustion vaporisers for the 
regasification of the LNG (ARI and ICF, 2008). Using an expansion ratio of 577 m3(n)/ m3(liq) 
(International Gas Union, 2012) and the CO2 emission factor provided by the American 
Petroleum Institute (2015),6 the emission intensity of regasification is 30.536 kg/Sm3o.e. 
 
3.2 Other emissions 
NOx emissions mainly depend on the technologies used for power generation: low-NOx 
turbines significantly reduce the amount of NOx emitted into the atmosphere compared to 
conventional turbines. The strict requirements introduced by the Norwegian government have 
incentivised investment in low-NOx technologies in recent field developments. This explains 
the high NOx intensity of the Statfjord chain, which was developed long before these measures 
were introduced (Figure 3.2). The next highest NOx intensity is from the Sleipner Vest chain, 
which has no low-NOx turbines installed, the same as Sleipner Øst.  
 
Figure 3.2 NOx emission intensity (kg/Sm
3o.e.) 
                                               
6 For emissions of NOx, nmVOC and CH4, we used the Norwegian industry-specific emission factors.    
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The use of low-NOx technologies on the Hammerfest LNG facility made it possible to have a 
rather low NOx emission intensity for the onshore part of the LNG chain. Not taking into account 
the Statfjord chain as a clear outlier, the NOx intensity of the LNG chains is only marginally 
higher than that of several of the pipeline chains. It should also be noted that we assume that 
conventional turbines are used to generate power for regasification. If low-NOx technologies 
are also used for regasification, the NOx-intensity advantage of the pipeline chains over the 
LNG chains can be mitigated. 
The advantage of the pipeline chains over LNG is unquestionable in terms of nmVOC and CH4 
emissions (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). The main sources of these emissions are fugitive 
emissions and cold vents. Due to the specificity of the technology, leakage is more inherent to 
the LNG. It should be noted that the reported fugitive emissions from the fields are based on 
industry-specific factors, and the resulting estimates are characterised as highly uncertain. The 
reported fugitive emissions from the onshore facilities are based on onsite measurements.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 nmVOC emission intensity (kg/Sm3o.e.) 
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Figure 3.4 CH4 emission intensity (kg/Sm
3o.e.) 
 
3.3 Indirect emissions related to the construction and 
decommissioning of facilities 
The construction of offshore platforms, pipelines and processing plants requires substantial 
volumes of steel and concrete. The production of these materials is highly energy intensive 
and causes significant greenhouse gas emissions. We assume that the amount of materials 
required for the construction of platforms and processing facilities for pipeline and LNG chains 
are analogous and can therefore be ignored in this study. Our focus is on the transportation 
part of the chains: LNG carriers and pipelines. The steel from an old LNG carrier can be 
recycled, and therefore, the emissions to air caused by its production are limited. The 
decommissioned pipelines, according to Norwegian regulation, can be left at site as industrial 
waste and, hence, will not be recycled, thus representing a source of indirect emissions. We 
estimate the CO2 emissions associated with pipeline production and installation based on the 
data provided in the plan for the development and installation of the Polarled pipeline (Statoil, 
2012). The Polarled rich gas pipeline (481 km, capacity 70 MSm3/day) requires 325,000 tonnes 
of steel and 250,000 tonnes of concrete. The expected lifetime of the pipeline is 50 years. 
Assuming the following rather conservative utilisation scenario: 60% for the first 10 years, 80% 
for the next 40 years, we obtain 931 billion Sm3 of gas transported during the lifetime of the 
pipeline. The installation and preparation of the pipeline for operation generates approximately 
44,000 tonnes of CO2. According to the World Steel Association (2015), on average, 1.8 tonnes 
of CO2 are emitted for every tonne of steel produced. The production of one tonne of concrete 
on average generates emissions of approximately 1.05 tonnes of CO2 (National Ready Mixed 
Concrete Association, 2012). 
By calculating the total CO2 emissions, and weighing them by the total amount of gas 
transported during the Polarled pipeline’s lifetime, we obtained 0.96 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. of 
gas transported. Taking into account the facts that pipelines can be in use longer than the 
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expected lifetime and that the utilisation rate may be higher than what we assume, the number 
obtained is the upper bound for the unit indirect emissions. We conclude that the indirect 
environmental effect of pipeline production and installation are marginal and do not significantly 
affect the results.  
 
4 Discussion 
The results of this comparative study corroborate the general findings of other studies that 
pipeline transportation chains environmentally outperform LNG-based chains, as LNG chains 
comprise extra processing steps (e.g. Kavalov et al., 2009). However, this empirical analysis 
highlights several other important aspects. 
The most important observation is the variability of the environmental performance of different 
technological solutions and the corresponding emission intensities. This limits the usability of 
average estimates and restricts the scope for drawing general conclusions regarding pipeline 
transportation emission intensities. In cases where the fields are geographically close to the 
shore and electricity is available from the main grid (e.g. Ormen Lange and Troll), pipeline 
transportation is indeed ‘green’. In other cases (e.g. Norne, Kristin and Åsgard), long distances 
and the need to generate power offshore make pipeline transportation significantly more 
emission-intensive. For pipeline chains where connection to the main electricity grid onshore 
is not technically possible or not economically reasonable, the largest contributor to the total 
CO2 emissions is the combustion of natural gas in power-generating turbines. The comparison 
between the Kristin and Åsgard chains also indicates that the unit emissions of larger fields 
may be lower than that of smaller ones. Due to technological specificity, LNG chains are 
significantly more CH4- and nmVOC-intensive than pipeline chains. With regard to NOx 
emissions, there is no clear advantage of the considered pipelines over LNG chains.  
In the above analysis, we focused on the environmental footprint of pipeline gas and LNG from 
production fields to the receiving terminals of consuming markets. However, extraction and 
processing segments of pipeline and LNG chains do not have major technological differences 
that would make the emission intensity of these two segments different for pipeline and LNG 
gas. Thus, it is interesting to consider the transportation segments separately. The existing 
literature (e.g. Taglia and Rossi, 2012) does not distinguish upstream transportation as a 
separate segment of the value chain; it is treated as a component of processing. We consider 
upstream transportation as part of a complete transportation solution for a field on the basis of 
the following considerations. An LNG solution assumes that a liquefaction facility is built 
geographically close to the field, meaning that the upstream transportation segment is in fact 
absent, as in the Snøhvit case, or is very short if a field were to be situated further from the 
shore, and compression would be required to deliver the gas onshore. As opposed to LNG, 
investments in pipeline gas infrastructure have very high economies of scale: there are low 
costs to establish overcapacity, both in the pipelines and in the processing facilities. In addition, 
higher-dimension pipelines are more energy efficient, incurring lower unit operating costs in 
comparison to low-dimension pipelines. Therefore, new fields are usually connected to existing 
plants with spare capacity, often with long upstream transportation segments, as in the Aasta 
Hansteen case.  
Norne is the only pipeline chain for which the available data allows the precise separation of 
the emissions related to upstream gas transportation. Out of 133.529 kg of CO2 emitted 
offshore per unit of gas, 103.059 kg is related to the power generation for gas transportation 
to the processing plant. An additional 17.916 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. is related to export 
transportation from the plant to Europe. In total, out of 175.986 kg of CO2 emitted per a Sm3o.e. 
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of gas produced and transported from the Norne field to the receiving terminal in Germany, 
120.975 kg of CO2 is generated by pipeline transportation (upstream and export). These 
emissions can be compared to the emissions categorised as related to LNG transportation, 
that is, emissions from liquefaction, shipping and regasification. For the hypothetical 
Zeebrugge LNG chain, these emissions are 226.928 kg of CO2 per Sm3o.e. of gas delivered.  
Table 4.1 presents our estimates of the transportation-related emissions for the other chains. 
Pipeline transportation accounts for about 55–70% of the total CO2 emissions of the chains 
that utilise gas-based power for transportation while LNG transportation accounts for about 
80–85% of the total CO2 emissions.  













Ormen Lange - Langeled 2.40 
Troll - Zeepipe 6.51 
Kvitebjørn - Europipe  14.36 7.90 55.01 
A.Hansteen - Langeled 34.24 23.38 68.28 
Sleipner Øst 63.84 40.21 62.99 
Sleipner Vest 76.14 41.68 54.75 
Åsgard - Europipe II 110.99 44.76 17.92 56.47 
Kristin - Europipe II 126.43 66.08 17.92 66.43 
Norne - Europipe II 175.99 103.06 17.92 68.74 
Statfjord - Statpipe 352.40 218.93 27.42 69.91 
Snøhvit - Zeebrugge 286.20 226.93 79.29 
Snøhvit - Iberdrola 309.45 250.18 80.85 
Snøhvit - Cove Point 385.03 325.76 84.61 
A direct comparison of pipeline and LNG transportation may not by reasonable in cases where 
LNG is transported over long distances where pipeline transportation is impossible. For 
infrastructure development decisions made by an exporting nation, however, it is of interest to 
focus on the domestic part of the transportation chain. For pipeline chains, all the emissions 
from upstream and export transportation are attributed to the domestic part of the value chain 
because compression takes place at pipeline entries. For LNG transportation, domestic 
emissions are only those from liquefaction. Figure 4.1 shows that the domestic part of the 
transportation-related emissions of the pipeline chains are lower than that of the LNG chains. 
However, domestic emissions of the transportation part of the longest pipeline chain, Norne, 
are only 17.69% lower than that of the domestic part of the LNG chains.  
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Figure 4.1 Total CO2 emissions and the domestic part of transportation-related CO2 
emissions (kg/Sm3o.e.) 
In fact, the infrastructure development decisions in the gas transport sector internalize only the 
domestic part of the transportation-related emissions, through the respective environmental 
taxes and quotas. The discussion of the carbon prices lays out of the scope of this paper; 
however, it is worth mentioning that the increase of these prices can affect significantly the 
transport infrastructure development in the gas sector in the future. 
The evaluation and analysis of emissions to air from gas production and transportation chains 
can contribute to decision-making regarding new major infrastructure development, especially 
in remote areas like the Barents Sea. The choice between the expansion of the existing LNG 
solution and a new pipeline, which would connect gas fields in the Barents Sea with the existing 
pipeline network, not only has long-term economic consequences but also considerable 
environmental impacts. Therefore, the evaluation of the environmental effects of infrastructure 
development alternatives, according to their social value, represents an important component 
of the socio-economic analysis of the project.  
In light of the increasing environmental concerns and stricter environmental policies of many 
gas consuming countries, infrastructure development decisions of gas producers may affects 
their competitive positions in the markets. For example, the existing pipeline network may give 
Norway an advantage in terms of ‘green’ competition in supplying Europe’s energy needs in 
the long run. According to the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (2015), the 
world average CO2 emissions per tonne of hydrocarbon production is about 130 kg, while the 
corresponding number for Norway is 55 kg (Gavenas et al., 2015). In combination with the low 
emission intensity of export transportation, it makes Norwegian gas an important contributor 
to Europe’s transition to the ‘green’ economy. 
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5 Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to estimate and compare the environmental footprint of pipeline and 
LNG chains. The results show that pipeline chains have a significant advantage over LNG 
chains with regard to CO2, CH4 and nmVOC emissions. However, the environmental footprint 
of pipeline chains varies significantly, depending on the chain configurations. The isolated 
analysis of the CO2 emissions from the transportation segments of the chains also proves the 
superiority of pipeline chains. Considering the CO2 emissions only from the domestic part of 
transportation chains, we found that although pipeline chains still outperform LNG, the 
transportation-related emissions of the longest pipeline chain, which uses gas-based power 
for compression, are not significantly lower than the domestic emissions of LNG transportation.  
The complexity of the considered network of fields and pipelines required some simplifications 
and assumptions regarding the allocation of the emissions among the processes. An even 
higher precision level would therefore be achievable through further consideration of some 
important aspects. One of these is the fact that due to freezing constraints in the LNG process 
system, almost all the CO2 is removed from the feed gas while the pipeline gas has a CO2 
content of up to 2.5 mol%. Therefore, the final combustion of these two products will have 
different CO2 emissions to air.  
It should also be noted that the Norwegian gas sector has specific characteristics such as 
offshore deep-water field locations, relatively long distances to the market, mainly subsea 
pipeline transportation, low sulphur content in gas and regulation, which allows gas flaring only 
for safety reasons. These factors affect the estimates obtained in this study and require careful 
consideration before our findings can be applied to other settings. However, the results and 
conceptual model developed would prove useful in the analysis of alternative gas 
transportation systems in other parts of the world.  
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